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Abstract
The emergence of network programmability enabled by innovations such as active network-
ing, SDN and NFV offers tremendous flexibility to program network policies. However,
it also poses a new demand to network operators on programming network policies. The
motivation of this dissertation is to study the feasibility of using high-level abstractions to
simplify the programming of network policies.
First, we propose scenario-based programming, a framework that allows network operators to program
stateful network policies by describing example behaviors in representative
scenarios. Given these scenarios, our scenario-based programming tool NetEgg automatically infers the
controller state that needs to be maintained along with the rules to process network events and update state.
The NetEgg interpreter can execute the generated policy implementation on top of a centralized controller,
but also automatically infers
flow-table rules that can be pushed to switches to improve throughput. We study a range of policies
considered in the literature and report our experience regarding specifying these policies using scenarios. We
evaluate NetEgg based on the computational requirements of our synthesis algorithm as well as the overhead
introduced by the generated policy implementation. Our results show that our synthesis algorithm can
generate policy implementations in seconds, and the automatically generated policy implementations have
performance comparable to their hand-crafted implementations. Our preliminary user study results show that
NetEgg was able to reduce the programming time of the policies we studied.
Second, we propose NetQRE, a high-level declarative language for programming quantitative network
policies that require monitoring a stream of network packets. Based on a novel theoretical foundation of
parameterized quantitative regular expressions, NetQRE integrates regular-expression-like pattern matching
at flow-level as well as application-level payloads with aggregation operations such as sum and average counts.
We describe a compiler for NetQRE that automatically generates an efficient implementation from the
specification in NetQRE. Our evaluation results demonstrate that NetQRE is expressive to specify a wide
range of quantitative network policies that cannot be naturally specified in other systems. The performance of
the generated implementations is comparable with that of the manually-optimized low-level code. NetQRE
can be deployed in different settings. Our proof-of-concept deployment shows that NetQRE can provide
timely enforcement of quantitative network policies.
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ABSTRACT
HIGH-LEVEL ABSTRACTIONS FOR PROGRAMMING NETWORK POLICIES
Yifei Yuan
Rajeev Alur
Boon Thau Loo
The emergence of network programmability enabled by innovations such as active network-
ing, SDN and NFV offers tremendous flexibility to program network policies. However,
it also poses a new demand to network operators on programming network policies. The
motivation of this dissertation is to study the feasibility of using high-level abstractions to
simplify the programming of network policies.
First, we propose scenario-based programming, a framework that allows network opera-
tors to program stateful network policies by describing example behaviors in representative
scenarios. Given these scenarios, our scenario-based programming tool NetEgg automati-
cally infers the controller state that needs to be maintained along with the rules to process
network events and update state. The NetEgg interpreter can execute the generated policy
implementation on top of a centralized controller, but also automatically infers flow-table
rules that can be pushed to switches to improve throughput. We study a range of policies
considered in the literature and report our experience regarding specifying these policies us-
ing scenarios. We evaluate NetEgg based on the computational requirements of our synthesis
algorithm as well as the overhead introduced by the generated policy implementation. Our
results show that our synthesis algorithm can generate policy implementations in seconds,
and the automatically generated policy implementations have performance comparable to
their hand-crafted implementations. Our preliminary user study results show that NetEgg
was able to reduce the programming time of the policies we studied.
Second, we propose NetQRE, a high-level declarative language for programming quan-
titative network policies that require monitoring a stream of network packets. Based on
a novel theoretical foundation of parameterized quantitative regular expressions, NetQRE
integrates regular-expression-like pattern matching at flow-level as well as application-level
vi
payloads with aggregation operations such as sum and average counts. We describe a
compiler for NetQRE that automatically generates an efficient implementation from the
specification in NetQRE. Our evaluation results demonstrate that NetQRE is expressive to
specify a wide range of quantitative network policies that cannot be naturally specified in
other systems. The performance of the generated implementations is comparable with that
of the manually-optimized low-level code. NetQRE can be deployed in different settings.
Our proof-of-concept deployment shows that NetQRE can provide timely enforcement of
quantitative network policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent years have seen the emergence of programmability in computer networks enabled
by a wave of revolutionary innovations, including active networking [85], SDN [65], and
NFV [30]. For example, software-defined networking (SDN) [65] promises rapid service
provisioning and agile network management by decoupling the control plane and the data
plane in networks. A logically centralized controller in SDN offers a global view of the
network and application programming interfaces (API) to enforce a variaty of network
policies. Furthermore, network functionality virtualization (NFV) [30] aims at shifting
network functions from a range of dedicated hardware to software deployed on general-
purpous computers. By programing network functions in software, NFV promises low
cost and high flexibily in deploying and managing network services. Not even mentioning
previous proposed active networking
This new wave of innovations offers network operators tremendous flexibility to pro-
gram custom network policies, ranging from traffic steering [14, 46, 90] to dynamic access
control [55, 71], from dynamic service chaining [39, 74] to network function migration [42].
While network programmability promises the aforementioned benefits, it poses a higher
(if not totally new) demand to network operators on programming. In order to thoroughly
understand the innovation trend and the challenges that come with it, in the fall of 2015 we
conducted informal interviews with 101 network operators, architects and engineers from
universities, telcos, service providers and router vendors, in the NSF I-Corps program [7].
We made two observations from the interviews. First, more than 80% interviewees agreed
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that network operators will need to program networks in the future. Second, they might lack
the required programming skills to program reliable networks. Our observations are consis-
tent with the online discussions we studied [10, 24, 25], which suggest that programming is
becoming an essential skill set for network operators, and it requires network operators to
have a deeper understanding on network programming.
To ease the job of programming network policies, in this disseratation, we study the
feasibility of using high-level abstractions for programming a range of network policies.
First, we consider stateful network policies which make decisions on each packet based
on the state it maintains and also update the state accordingly. As an example, consider
the following policy.
Example 1 (Learning switch). Consider the example where a network operator wants to
program a learning switch policy supporting migration of hosts on top of the controller for a
single switch. The learning switch learns incoming ports for hosts. For an incoming packet,
if the destination MAC address is learned, it sends this packet out to the port associated
with the destination MAC address; otherwise it floods the packet. To support migration of
hosts, the learning switch needs to remember the latest incoming port of a host.
To implement this policy, a network operator first has to manually maintain the state
indicating whether a port has been learned for a MAC address and also the mapping between
the hosts and incoming ports. Second, the network operator has to implement the logic to
update the state as each packet arrives. Third, in order to improve the throughput, the
network operator may need to manually update the flow table rules on the switch as the
state changes, which is nontrivial and error-prone [88]. As a result, it may be difficult and
time-consuming to implement this policy (see Section 2.6 and 2.7).
On the other hand, illustrating how the policy behaves seems much simpler and more
intuitive. For example, one can describe the behavior of this policy in a scenario using an ex-
ample trace of packets together with the actions that should be applied to each packet in the
trace. An interesting question is that can we synthesize the desired policy implementation
automatically from the example behaviors.
Second, we consider the network policies which may involve quantitative metrics addi-
tionally. As an example, consider the following policy.
Example 2 (Voice-over-IP monitoring). Consider the policy where an enterprise mon-
2
itors the usage of Voice-over-IP (VoIP) for each user, and alert the user whose usage is
significantly higher than the average usage over all users. We use the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) used in VoIP applications as our example. Typically, a call based on SIP
consists of three phases, init, call, and end. In the init phase, the caller and the callee
exchange messages (e.g. call ID, user name, the connection channel) in order to set up the
call session. Once established, the call phase allows VoIP data to be transmitted between
the caller and callee using the channel defined in the first phase. Finally, either side can
end the call as shown in the end phase.
To analyze the SIP call in the midst of network traffic from all types of protocols,
the protocol analyzer is required to (1) identify all SIP traffic traversing the network, (2)
separate the SIP traffic into different sessions for different caller/callee pairs, (3) group
packets within each session into phases (init, call, and end), and then perform a count
of bytes within the second (call) phase. Again, the network operator may face a set of
difficulties in manually maintaining the state (e.g. the state of SIP, the VoIP traffic count
of each call) and implementing the logic to update the state.
Unlike the previous example, it is not clear how to describe this policy using its example
behaviors. Instead, we explore the feasibility of specifying the policy in a high-level declar-
ative fashion. The challenge is to design a reasonably expressive specification language to
capture a wide range of such quantitative policies, together with the compilation techniques
in order to compile the specifications into efficient implementations.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the overview of our framework. To program a network policy,
the network operator simply describes the network policy in a declarative way using high-
level abstractions. The network operator does not need to implement low-level details of
the policy, such as what state to maintain and how to update it. Given the high-level
description of the network policy, a tool (e.g. a compiler, a synthesizer) automatically
generates the correponding low-level policy implementation that can run efficiently on the
network. As part of this generation, the tool automatically infers the state that needs to
be maintained from the high-level description, and generates the code that is necessary to
update the state.
In particular, this dissertation proposes the following two high-level programming ab-
stractions.
3
Figure 1.1: High-level programming framework.
• First, we propose scenario-based programming, a framework that allows network op-
erators to program stateful SDN policies, such as the one described in Example 1, by
describing its example behaviors in representative scenarios.
We have developed the NetEgg tool, including a synthesis algorithm and an interpreter
for executing policies. Given the scenarios as input, our synthesizer automatically
generates a controller program that is consistent with example behaviors, including
inferring the state that needs to implement the network policy, and rules for processing
packets and updating the state. The interpreter executes the generated policy program
for incoming network events on the controller, as well as infers rules that can be pushed
onto switches.
We validate the NetEgg tool by synthesizing SDN programs that use the POX con-
troller directly from examples. Our tool is agnostic to the choice of SDN controllers,
and can also be used in non-SDN settings. We demonstrate that using our approach,
we are able to synthesize a range of network policies using a small number of exam-
ples in seconds. The synthesized controller program has low performance overhead
and achieves comparable performance to equivalent imperative programs implemented
manually in POX. Moreover, the example scenarios are concise compared to equiv-
alent imperative programs. Our preliminary user study results show that NetEgg is
intuitive to learn and use, and can reduce the programming time of network policies.
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• Second, we propose NetQRE, a specification language and toolkit for quantitative
network policies, such as the example policy in Example 2.
NetQRE is declarative language for monitoring network packet streams based on a
novel theoretical foundation of parameterized quantitative regular expressions (PQRE).
PQRE extends prior work on QRE [18], which provides a formal foundation of combin-
ing traditional regular expressions with numerical computations. NetQRE integrates
regular-expression-like pattern matching at flow-level and application-level payloads
with aggregation operations such as sum and average counts.
We developed a compiler that can automatically generate efficient NetQRE imple-
mentations. As part of the compilation process, the compiler automatically infers the
state that needs to be maintained for NetQRE programs, and optimizes the compiled
imperative code. A NetQRE runtime then executes the generated code efficiently.
We have developed a NetQRE prototype which we evaluate over a range of quanti-
tative network policies. As a proof-of-concept deployment, we consider an evaluation
scenario where the NetQRE runtime taps into mirrored traffic within SDN switches,
and is integrated with an SDN controller. Our evaluation results demonstrate that
NetQRE can express a wide range of quantitative network policies that cannot be
naturally specified in other systems, results in performance that is comparable with
optimized manually-written low-level code and is significantly more efficient compared
to monitoring solutions based on Bro [73] and OpenSketch [91].
In the rest of the dissertation, we first elaborate NetEgg in Chapter 2, followed by the
description of NetQRE in Chapter 3. We discuss related work in Chapter 4. Finally, we
conclude the dissertation and discuss potential research directions related to this topic in
Chapter 5.
5
Chapter 2
NetEgg: Scenario-based
Programming for SDN Policies
In this chapter, we decribe the tool NetEgg. NetEgg is a scenario-based programming frame-
work that allows network operators to program network policies by describing representative
example behaviors. Given these scenarios, the synthesis algorithm automatically infers the
controller state that needs to be maintained along with the rules to process network events
and update state. The NetEgg policy interpreter can execute the generated policy imple-
mentation on top of a centralized controller, but also automatically infers flow-table rules
that can be pushed to switches to improve throughput.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of NetEgg
in Section 2.1. We use the learning switch policy as an example to illustrate the use of
NetEgg. Second, in Section 2.2 we describe the scenario-based programming framework,
which allows network operators to specify network policies using example behaviors in sce-
narios. Third, in Section 2.3 we describe the synthesizing algorithm that takes the scenarios
as input, and automatically generates a controller program that is consistent with example
behaviors, including inferring the state that is needed to implement the network policy and
rules for processing packets and updating states. Section 2.4 discusses how the interpreter
executes the generated policy program for incoming network events on the controller, as well
as infers rules that can be pushed onto switches. We show how to use NetEgg to program
a wide range of policies in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we present our evaluation results,
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which show that the synthesized policy implementation has low performance overhead and
achieves comparable performance to equivalent imperative programs implemented manually
in POX. We present our preliminary user study result in Section 2.7. Finally, we end this
chapter with a discussion in Section 2.8.
This chapter is based on the work orginially published in [93, 94].
2.1 Overview of NetEgg
Figure 2.1 provides a high-level overview of NetEgg. The network operator describes ex-
ample behaviors about the desired network policy in representative scenarios to NetEgg.
These scenarios can be expressed either in network timing diagrams using the graphic user
interface (see Figure 2.17), or in a configuration language, which we will describe in Sec-
tion 2.2. Given these scenarios, NetEgg first checks whether there exist conflicts among
the scenarios. If two scenarios conflict with one another, NetEgg displays the conflict to
the network operator. After the operator resolves all conflicts, NetEgg tries to generate a
policy described in the scenarios.
The generated policy uses a set of state tables and a policy table. State tables maintain
the state used to remember the history of a policy execution. The policy table dictates
the actions for processing incoming network events and updates to state tables for various
cases.
When executing the policy, the interpreter, sitting on top of the controller, looks up the
policy table for incoming network events (e.g. packetin, connectionup and other events),
which will determine state table updates and actions to be applied to the network events.
Moreover, NetEgg automatically infers rule updates to the data plane from current state of
the policy execution, thus reducing controller overhead and network delay.
While NetEgg is general to handle any network events, we focus on packetin events in
this paper in order to simplify our presentation.
2.1.1 Illustrative Example
To illustrate the use of NetEgg, let us revisit the learning switch example introduced in
Chapter 1. Recall that a network operator wants to program a learning switch policy
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Figure 2.1: NetEgg architecture.
supporting migration of hosts on top of the controller for a single switch. The learning
switch learns incoming ports for hosts. For an incoming packet, if the destination MAC
address is learned, it sends this packet out to the port associated with the destination MAC
address; otherwise it floods the packet. To support migration of hosts, the learning switch
needs to remember the latest incoming port of a host.
To program the policy, the network operator simply describes example behaviors of the
policy in representative scenarios, in the form of network timing diagrams. Figure 2.2 shows
a scenario described by network operators.
Scenario 1
flood
<P1,h1,h2>
<P2,h3,h1>
send(P1)
<P3,h2,h3>
send(P2)
Figure 2.2: A scenario describing the learning switch. In the scenario, a packet is denoted
by a 3-tuple: 〈incoming port, source MAC, destination MAC〉.
The scenario. In this scenario, the network operator describes example behaviors of
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the policy using three packets. The first packet arriving on port P1 with source MAC
address h1 and destination MAC address h2 is flooded by the switch, since no port has been
learned for h2. The second packet from h3 to h1 should be sent directly to the port P1,
according to the port learned from the first packet. The third packet from h2 to h3 should
be sent to the port P2, since the second packet indicts that h3 is associated with port P2.
Note that instead of using real port numbers and MAC addresses in the packet, the network
operator uses variables for each field. The variables stand for a variety of concrete values.
Given this scenario, NetEgg automatically synthesizes the desired program. The syn-
thesized program can be executed on the SDN controller, as well as install flow table rules
onto switches. As part of the program generation, NetEgg automatically generates the data
structures and code necessary to implement the policy.
Network operators may further test the synthesized program using existing verification
and testing techniques, and refine the program if needed. As part of refinement, network
operators simply illustrate new scenarios (e.g. obtained from counter examples) to NetEgg,
and NetEgg automates the refinement by synthesizing a new program from the new set of
scenarios. We will demonstrate more use cases in Section 2.5.
Using the learning switch example, in the following subsections, we first describe the
state tables that are generated by our tool, before describing the policy.
2.1.2 State Tables
In our example, the learning switch needs to remember whether a port is learned for a
MAC address, and if learned, which port is associated with the MAC address. Hence, the
generated policy maintains a state table ST , which stores a state and a value (in this case
a port number) for each MAC address. An example of the snapshot of ST is shown below.
MAC state value
A 1 2
OP... ... ...
Our tool automatically derives the facts that for a given MAC address macaddr, the
state of macaddr in ST is either 0 or 1, indicating that the port associated with macaddr is
unknown yet, or learned, respectively. ST also stores a port for MAC addresses with state
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1. Initially, the program assigns all states in the table to be 0. The program accounts for
two cases: 1) When the destination port is unknown, it floods the packet through all ports;
2) When the incoming packet’s destination port is known, it sends the packet out through
the port associated with the destination MAC address. In both cases, the state associated
with the source MAC address is set to be 1, and the incoming port for the source MAC
address is remembered.
2.1.3 Policy Tables
The state table is manipulated by rules implementing the desired policy. These rules are
captured in a policy table, as shown in Table 2.1 for the learning switch example. We delay
the discussion of its generation to Section 2.3.
match test actions update
* ST (dstmac).state=0 flood ST (srcmac):=(1, port)
* ST (dstmac).state=1 send(ST (dstmac).value) ST (srcmac):=(1, port)
Table 2.1: The policy table for the learning switch.
The policy table contains two rules, represented as the two rows in the table, corre-
sponding to the two cases in the program described above. Every rule has four components:
match, test, actions and update. The match specifies the packet fields and corresponding
values that a packet should match. In this example, no matches need to be specified and
we use ∗ to denote the wildcard. The test is a conjunction of checks, each of which checks
whether the state associated with some fields in a state table equals a certain value. For ex-
ample, the test in the second rule has one check ST (dstmac).state=1, which checks whether
the state associated with the dstmac address of the packet is 1 in ST . The actions define
the actions that are applied to matched packets. In this example, the action in the first rule
floods the matched packet to all ports and the action send(ST (dstmac).value) in the second
rule first reads the value (in this case, the port) stored in ST for the dstmac address of the
matched packet, and sends the packet to that port. The update is a sequence of writes, each
of which changes the state and value associated with some fields in a state table to certain
values. For example, the write ST (srcmac):=(1,port) changes the state associated with the
srcmac address of the packet to 1 in ST , and stores the value associated with the srcmac
10
address of the packet to the port of it.
2.1.4 Interpreter
The interpreter processes incoming packets at the controller using the policy table. The
pseudocode of the interpreter is shown in Figure 2.3. The interpreter matches each incoming
packet against each rule in the policy table in order. A rule is matched, if the packet fields
match the match and all checks in the test of the rule are satisfied. The first matched
rule applies actions to the packet, and state tables are updated according to the update
of the rule. Moreover, NetEgg automatically infers the rules that can be installed on the
data plane from the latest configuration of state tables. The corresponding function is
update flowtable in the pseudocode. We will describe policy execution in more detail in
Section 2.4.
Input: a packet p
for i = 1 to n do
if rule ri matches p then
execute the actions and update of rule ri on p
update flowtable(p)
return
end if
end for
apply default actions to p
Figure 2.3: The interpreter pseudocode.
Example. Figure 2.4 shows an illustrative execution for the incoming packet trace in
subfigure (a). Since the purpose of this example is to illustrate how a policy table is
executed, we assume that every packet is processed on the controller. Initially, all states
in the state table ST are 0, and all values are ⊥, meaning unknown, as shown in subfigure
(b). The first packet p1 is matched against each rule in Table 2.1 in order at the controller.
The first matched rule is the first rule, since p1 matches the match (∗) and the state of the
field dstmac of p1 in ST is 0, satisfying the check (ST (dstmac).state=0) in test of the rule.
Therefore, the rule applies the action which instructs the switch to flood p1, and updates
the state table as in subfigure (c). The second packet p2 in the trace matches the second
rule in the policy table, since the state of its dstmac is 1. The program sends p2 out to port
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2, which is stored in the state table associated with MAC address A. Applying the update
of the rule, we get the state table as in subfigure (d). The third packet p3 matches the
second rule in the policy table, and the updated state table remains the same and thus not
shown here. The last packet p4 suggests that the host with MAC address A has migrated
to port 3. This packet matches the second rule in the policy table and gets sent to port 1.
Subfigure (e) shows the state table after applying the update.
p2:<port=1, srcmac=B, dstmac=A>
p3:<port=2, srcmac=A, dstmac=B>
p4:<port=3, srcmac=A, dstmac=B>
p1:<port=2, srcmac=A, dstmac=B> MAC state value
A 0 ⊥
B 0 ⊥
(a) An example packet trace (b) The initial state table (c) The state table after p1
MAC state value
A 1 2
B 0 ⊥
(d) The state table after p2
MAC state value
A 1 2
B 1 1
(e) The state table after p4
MAC state value
A 1 3
B 1 1
Figure 2.4: An illustrative execution.
2.2 NetEgg Model
In this section, we first describe the scenario-based programming model of NetEgg, and
explain how this model allows the operator to describe example network behaviors in repre-
sentative scenarios. Second, we define the policy model, which includes the model of state
tables and policy tables. We will show how to generate a policy from scenarios in the next
section.
2.2.1 Scenario-based Programming Framework
NetEgg provides a configuration language for expressing network timing diagrams. In this
language, variables and fields of packets are typed. Examples of base types we use are
bool, PORT, IP ADDR(set of IP addresses), MAC ADDR (set of MAC addresses). A packet-type
consists of a list of names along with their types for each field in the packet. In our example,
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Packet-type P ::= 〈f1 : T1, .., fk : Tk〉
Symbolic packet sp ::= 〈sv1, .., svk〉
Action a ::= drop|flood|send(port)
|modify(f,v)|..
Event e ::= sp⇒ [a1, .., ai]
Scenario sc ::= [e1, .., ej ]
Program prog ::= {sc1, .., scn}
Figure 2.5: Scenario-based programming model.
the packet-type consists of three fields and is given by 〈port : PORT, srcmac : MAC ADDR,
dstmac : MAC ADDR 〉.
A (concrete) packet specifies a value for each field of type corresponding to that field.
A symbolic value of a type T is either a concrete value of type T, or a variable x of type T.
A symbolic packet specifies a symbolic value for each field.
We use Act to denote the set of action primitives for processing packets. For the action
primitives with parameters, the user can use either concrete values or variables of the
corresponding type.
In NetEgg, we provide a library that supports standard packet fields and actions such
as drop, flood, send(port) (send to a port), modify(f,v) (modify the value of field f to v).
Our tool also supports user-defined packet-type using customized field names and types, as
well as user-defined actions. One can generalize it by providing handlers for user-defined
fields and action primitives.
An event is a pair of a symbolic packet sp and a list of actions [a1, ..al], denoted as
sp ⇒ [a1, .., al]. A scenario is a finite sequence of events. A scenario-based program is a
finite set of scenarios.
With the notation, the scenario of Figure 2.2 can be written as in Figure 2.6.
P1, h1, h2⇒flood
P2, h3, h1⇒send(P1)
P3, h2, h3⇒send(P2)
Figure 2.6: The scenario corresponding to Figure 2.2 for the learning switch example.
A scenario is concrete if all the symbolic packets and actions appearing in the scenario
have only concrete values. A scenario-based program with symbolic scenarios can be viewed
as a short-hand for a set of concrete scenarios. This set is obtained by replacing each variable
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by every possible value of the corresponding type with the following requirements. First, a
variable can only take values that have not appeared in the scenario-based program. Second,
if the same variable appears in multiple symbolic packets and actions in the program, then
it gets replaced by the same value. Third, different variables in a program get replaced by
different values. Thus, the symbolic scenario of Figure 2.2 corresponds to Πi=0,1,2(n−i)(l−i)
concrete scenarios if the type MAC ADDR and PORT contain n and l distinct values, respectively.
The language itself is simple and can be viewed more as a configuration language rather
than a general-purpose programming language. We also build a visual tool that takes as
input scenarios drawn as actual network timing diagrams, and generate the configuration
(see Figure 2.17).
2.2.2 Policy Model
A policy consists of a policy table along with state tables that store the history of policy
execution.
State Tables. A state table is a key-value map that maintains states and values for
relevant fields. Let Tij be some base type appearing in the packet-type, S be a state set
with finitely many states, and the packet-type be 〈f1 : T1,..,fk : Tk〉. A d-dimensional state
table ST stores a state in S and a value of type Tid+1 , for all keys of type Ti1 × ..× Tid
The operations we allow on a state table are reads, checks and writes.
Let ST be a state table of type T1 × .. × Td → S × Td+1, let f1,..fd be field names
of type T1,..,Td, respectively. A read of ST indexes some entry in ST , and is of the form
ST (f1,..,fd). A check of ST checks whether the state associated with some key is a particular
state. Syntactically, it is a pair of a read and a state, written as ST (f1,..,fd).state=s, where
s ∈ S is a state. In our example, ST (dstmac).state=0 is a check with the field dstmac. In
contrast to a check, a write of a state table changes the state along with the value associated
with some key. A write of ST is of the form ST (f1,..,fd):=(sv,fv). Here, sv is either a state,
or - representing no change. fv is either a concrete value of type Td+1, - representing no
change, or a field name of type Td+1. In our example, ST (srcmac):=(1,port) is a write of
ST with the field srcmac.
We use the term configurations for the snapshots of state tables. For example, the
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initial configuration of the state table in our example maps every MAC address to (0,⊥)
as shown in figure 2.4(b). Here, we use ⊥ to represent the fact that no value is stored. A
read ST (f1,..,fd) for a packet p at a configuration c returns the state-value pair stored in
ST for the key (p.f1, .., p.fd) at c. We use ST (f1,..,fd).state and ST (f1,..,fd).value to denote
the state and value in the returned pair. A check ST (f1,..,fd).state=s is true for a packet p
at a configuration c if the state read from ST at the configuration c is s. In the example
in Figure 2.4, ST (dstmac).state=0 is true for p1 at the initial configuration (subfigure
(b)) of ST . A write ST (f1,..,fd):=(sv,fv) for a packet p writes the state-value pair to the
corresponding entry indexed by the read. Note that if sv(fv, resp.) is -, the write does not
write any state(value, resp.) to ST , and if fv specifies a field name, the value of p.fv should
be written.
Policy Tables. Given a set of state tables T , a rule r based on T has four components,
namely, match, test, actions and update. match is of the form 〈f1=v1,..,fk=vk〉, where fi is
a name of a packet field, and vi is a concrete value or a wildcard. A packet p matches
〈f1=v1,..,fk=vk〉 iff vi is a wildcard, or p.fi = vi for all i = 1 to k. The actions is a list
of actions using action primitives in Act. In the case where an action primitive accepts
parameters, the parameters can be concrete values or values read from state tables in T
using reads. test is a conjunction of checks and update is a sequence of writes, where each
check/write is of some state table in T . As an example, last two rows in Table 2.1 are two
rules. A policy table based on T is an ordered list of rules, and every rule is based on T .
A configuration C of a policy consists of all the configurations of each state table in T ,
on which the policy table is based. A packet p matches a rule at a configuration C iff p
matches match and every check in test is true for p at the corresponding configuration in
C. Suppose the first matched rule for a packet p at a configuration C is r. Then actions
of r will be executed on p and every write in update of r will be executed. We denote the
execution for packet p as C p/as−−−→PT C′, with C′ the new configuration, and as the actions
applied to p.
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2.3 Policy Generation
Given a set of scenarios describing a policy, our synthesizer first checks if there are conflicts
among the scenarios. If there are no conflicts existing in the scenario, NetEgg tries to
generate a policy consistent with all scenarios.
In this section, we first describe the objective policies NetEgg aims to generate. Then we
describe how to detect conflicts in the scenarios. Finally, we present the synthesis algorithm
for scenarios without conflicts in steps.
2.3.1 The Policy Learning Problem
First, we note that, since the input scenarios describe the behaviors of the desired policy
in representative scenarios, the generated policy should be consistent with all the behaviors
described in all scenarios.
Definition 1 (Consistency). Given a concrete scenario SC = [sp1 ⇒ as1, .., spk ⇒ ask], a
policy table PT is consistent with SC iff Ci−1 spi/asi−−−−→PT Ci for i = 1, .., k, where C0 is the
initial configuration in which every state table maps every key to the initial state 0 and a
value of ⊥. A policy table is consistent with a scenario-based program, iff it is consistent
with all the concrete scenarios represented by the scenario-based program.
As an example, the policy given in Table 2.1 is consistent with the scenario in Figure 2.2.
However, the following policy is not consistent with the scenario, since it floods the third
packet in the scenario instead of sending it to P2.
match test actions update
* ST (dstmac).state=0 flood ST (srcmac):=(1, port)
* ST (dstmac).state=1 send(ST (dstmac).value) ST (srcmac):=(-, -)
Table 2.2: An inconsistent policy table.
In addition to consistency, NetEgg also aims to generate a generalized policy from input
scenarios. For this, we aim at generating a consistent policy with minimal number of rules.
To see how this heuristic can help to generate a general policy, let us consider the 3-rule
policy table in Table 2.3. It can be verified that the policy is consistent with the scenario
in Figure 2.2. However, this policy overfits the input scenario and will not generalize to a
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fourth packet such as 〈P1, h4, h2〉, because this packet would be flooded by the policy. On
the other hand, the desired policy in Table 2.1 only uses two rules, and can handle the
fourth packet mentioned above correctly.
match test actions update
* ST (dstmac).state=0 flood ST (srcmac):=(1, port)
* ST (dstmac).state=1 send(ST (dstmac).value) ST (srcmac):=(2, port)
* ST (dstmac).state=2 send(ST (dstmac).value) ST (srcmac):=(-, -)
Table 2.3: A consistent yet restrictive policy table.
We summarize the major computational problem as the following policy learning prob-
lem.
Policy learning problem. Given scenarios SC1, ..., SCn, the policy learning problem
seeks a set of state tables T and a policy table PT based on T , such that (1) PT is consistent
with all scenarios SCi. (2) PT has the smallest number of rules among all consistent policy
tables.
2.3.2 Conflict Detection
Two concrete scenarios conflict with one another if they describe different behaviors for a
same sequence of packets. Thus, there is no policy consistent with a scenario-based program
if there exist two conflicting concrete scenarios represented by the scenario-based program.
In this subsection, we describe how NetEgg detects conflicts in the input scenario-
based program. In particular, our conflict detection algorithm checks whether there exist
two concrete scenarios represented by the scenario-based program which conflict with one
another. The conflict detection accounts for two cases. First, the two concrete scenarios are
represented by a single symbolic scenario in the scenario-based program. Second, the two
concrete scenarios are represented by two symbolic scenarios in the scenario-based program.
For the first case, let us consider two concrete conflicting scenarios S1 and S2, and
suppose they are obtained from the symbolic scenario SC. Let us further suppose that S1
and S2 first differ at the i-th event. That is, 1) all events before the i-th one are the same
in both S1 and S2; 2) the i-th event p1 ⇒ as1 in S1 and the i-th event p2 ⇒ as2 in S2
describe the same packet (i.e. p1 = p2), but different actions (i.e. as1 6= as2). In particular,
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there must exist a position k, such that the k-th action ak1 in as1 is different from the k-th
action ak2 in as2. Since both S1 and S2 are obtained from SC by instantiating the variables
in SC, both ak1 and a
k
2 must have the same action primitive, but different parameters that
are instantiated from a variable x in SC. Therefore, it must be the case that x have not
appeared in any symbolic packets spj in SC, for all j ≤ i. Here, spj is the symbolic packet
in the j-th event in SC. Otherwise, S1 and S2 describe different packets at event j for some
j ≤ i.
To summarize the above idea, Algorithm 1 shows the algorithm to detect conflicts for
this case.
Algorithm 1 detect conflicts case1
1: for each scenario SC do
2: for i = 1 to |SC| do
3: let spi ⇒ asi be the i-th event of SC
4: if asi contains a variable that does not appear in any of spj for j ≤ i then
5: return conflict found in scenario SC at event i
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
9: return no conflict
Similarly, for the second case, the algorithm checks whether two symbolic scenarios
describe conflicting behaviors for a same sequence of packets.
Algorithm 2 describes the algorithm for detecting conflicts for the second case. For
every pair of scenarios SC1 and SC2 in the scenario-based program (line 1), the algorithm
checks whether there exist conflicts for the sequence of packets p1...pi in the two scenarios
(line 4-21). The algorithm first pre-processes the variables in the two scenarios (line 2)
by replacing each variable x in SC1 using a new variable x1. This pre-process accounts
for the fact that the variable x in SC1 can be replaced by a value that is different from
the value used in SC2. The algorithm further maintains a constraint C which is used for
checking whether the sequence of packets p1...pi exists. Initially, C contains the constraints
indicating that all variables are different from one another in a scenario, and also different
from all concrete values appeared in the scenario (line 3). The checking process is conducted
incrementally. In each iteration in the for loop at line 4, the algorithm checks whether the
i-th symbolic packet in SC1 can represent a packet that can also be represented by the i-th
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Algorithm 2 detect conflicts case2
1: for each pair of scenarios (SC1,SC2) do
2: replace each variable x by x1 in SC1 and x2 in SC2
3: initialize the constraint C
4: for i = 1 to min(|SC1|,|SC2|) do
5: let spji ⇒ asji be the i-th event of SCj , j = 1, 2
6: for all field f in the packet do
7: C = C ∧ {sv1 = sv2}, svj is the symbolic value of field f in spji
8: end for
9: if C is satisfiable then
10: if 1) |as1i | 6= |as2i | or 2) from some k, as1i [k] and as2i [k] have different primitives
or different number of parameters then
11: return conflict found in SC1 and SC2 at event i
12: end if
13: for each symbolic value sv1 appeared in as
1
i and the symbolic value sv2 appeared
in as2i at the same position do
14: if C ∧ {sv1 6= sv2} is satisfiable then
15: return conflict found in SC1 and SC2 at event i
16: end if
17: end for
18: else
19: no conflict in SC1 and SC2; continue for the next pair of scenarios
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: return no conflict
symbolic packet in SC2. Therefore, the algorithm needs to check for each field whether the
symbolic values of that field can be the same in the two symbolic packets by adding the
corresponding constraint to C (line 7). If C becomes unsatisfiable, we conclude that the
packet sequence p1...pi cannot exist, therefore the algorithm reports no conflicts in SC1 and
SC2, and continues the checking for the next pair of scenarios (line 19). However, if C is
satisfiable, such a packet sequence exists, thus the algorithm further checks whether SC1
and SC2 may contain different actions for it (line 9-18). SC1 and SC2 may conflict with
each other in two cases. First, the action lists have different length in two scenarios, or they
contains different action primitives at some position, or some actions at a position accepts
different number of parameters (line 10-11). Second, the variables used as parameters at
some position in the action lists can represent different values (line 13-17). For the second
case, it suffices for the algorithm to check whether C together with the corresponding
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constraint is satisfiable (line 14).
In the following sections, we describe the synthesis algorithm for scenarios without
conflicts. We break our synthesis algorithm into steps, and discuss each step separately.
2.3.3 Policies without tests
First, let us consider the simplest case where the desired policy table does not have tests. In
this case, each rule in the policy table only consists of a match and actions. Thus, it suffices
to generate an ordered list of matches, together with the corresponding list of actions.
Generate ordered match list. We first describe the algorithm which generates a list
of matches from the input scenarios, shown in Algorithm 3. As defined in our scenario-
based programming model, a symbolic packet represents a set of concrete packets, which
is obtained by replacing symbolic values by concrete field values. Therefore, Algorithm 3
generates a match for each symbolic packet in the scenarios, by replacing symbolic values by
∗ (line 3). Moreover, to ensure that the generated match does not mismatch unrepresented
packets, the algorithm inserts the generated match to the list, such that no match under it
is completely covered (line 4). Note that for two generated matches which are overlapping
with each other, we can order either one above the other. We will explain this through an
example later in this subsection.
Algorithm 3 generate ordered match list([SCi])
1: L = ∅
2: for all packet sp = 〈fi=vi〉 in every scenario SCi do
3: let m = 〈fi=mi〉, where mi = vi if vi is a concrete value else ∗
4: insert m to L
5: end for
6: return L
Search for actions. With the ordered list of matches, it is straightforward to search for
the actions for every match in the list: we can simply search the first matched match in the
list for each symbolic packet and check consistency between the actions with the packet and
actions with the match. If actions for the match are not set, we can set them to the actions
associate with the symbolic packet. A consistent policy table is returned when all actions
in every symbolic events are consistent.
Examples. Consider a scenario describing a firewall, shown in Figure 2.7(a). Here a
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A, ip1⇒ send(1)
ip2, B ⇒ send(2)
A,C ⇒ drop
(a) A scenario for the
policy.
match actions
srcip=A, dstip=C drop
srcip=A, dstip=∗ send(1)
srcip=∗, dstip=B send(2)
(b) The policy table.
Figure 2.7: A firewall example.
symbolic packet is expressed by 〈srcip, dstip〉. The generated policy table is shown in
Figure 2.7(b). The match column of the policy table is generated by Algorithm 3. We note
that if the second rule is swapped with the third rule in the policy table, the resulted policy
table is still consistent with the scenario. The reason is that by definition the variables ip1
and ip2 only represent values other than A,B,C. Thus, the packet 〈A,B〉 is not represented
by any symbolic packets in the scenario.
2.3.4 Policies with tests
Now we consider synthesizing policies that use tests. As an example, consider the scenario
for the learning switch in Figure 2.2. One can verify that a consistent policy table for the
scenario requires tests. In fact, the only match in the match list generated by Algorithm 3
is 〈∗〉, and every packet in the scenario matches it. However, their actions differ from each
other. Therefore, in addition to the only match 〈∗〉, a consistent policy table must have
tests. In this subsection, we will assume that all tests in the policy table are given, and show
the algorithm to synthesize the policy. We will relax this assumption in the next subsection.
Sketch. Suppose the tests used in the policy for learning switch are ST (dstmac).state=0
and ST (dstmac).state=1. Composing the match and test, we know that the policy table
has the form as shown in Table 2.4.
match test actions update
* ST (dstmac).state=0 ax1
ST (srcmac):=(sx1, ux1)
ST (dstmac):=(sx2, ux2)
* ST (dstmac).state=1 ax2
ST (srcmac):=(sx3, ux3)
ST (dstmac):=(sx4, ux4)
Table 2.4: A policy table sketch for the learning switch.
Table 2.4 is a symbolic representation of policy tables. It represents actions and update
21
in rules using variables. We call such symbolic representations policy table sketches (or
sketches in short). In this sketch, we derive all possible writes in update from the state
tables that are used in each rule’s tests. In this example, since the only state table accepts
keys of type MAC ADDR, the state table can be updated using either srcmac or the dstmac of
a packet. Therefore, we have two writes per rule in its update, and sx’s range over all states
(in this example, {0,1}) plus a special symbol - meaning no update, and ux’s range over all
field names plus -. For ease of presentation, we intentionally ignore potential overwrittings
due to the two writes in each rule’s update. In practice, we need to consider other orders
of writes as well. We use variables ax’s to represent possible actions for each rule. In
this example, ax’s can range from {flood, send(ST (srcmac)), send(ST (dstmac))}, which
are obtained from actions appearing in the scenario. To distinguish variables appearing in
sketches from variables appearing in the scenarios, we will call these variables appearing in
a sketch as sketch variables.
Algorithm 4 shows the algorithm of generating sketches given the match list L and
tests. The set C contains all possible reads to the state tables appearing in TESTS (line 1-
line 4), and this set is used to derive writes in each rule (line 7). The sketch is generated
by composing each match and test in TESTS (line 5-line 6), and every rule has all possible
writes derived from reads in C (line 7).
Algorithm 4 generate sketch(L, TESTS)
1: let C = ∅
2: for all state table ST appearing in TESTS do
3: add all reads ST (f1,..,fk) to C, where fi is a field name of the corresponding type.
4: end for
5: for all match match in L in order do
6: for all test test in TESTS do
7: construct a rule r = (match, test, ax, update), where ax is a new variable for actions,
and update = [readi:=(sxi,uxi)],∀readi ∈ C, sxi, uxi fresh variables.
8: add rule r to sketch
9: end for
10: end for
Search for sketch variables. Using the sketch, we can search concrete values for sketch
variables, with the goal that the obtained policy table is consistent with all scenarios. To
search for a consistent policy table, we perform a simple backtracking search algorithm over
22
all sketch variables. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 search sketch([SCi], sketch)
1: stack = []
2: for all scenarios SCi do
3: for all events ej in SCi do
4: let r be the first matching rule
5: initialize actions of r and push the sketch variable to stack, if r’s actions are not
set
6: if actions of ri are consistent then
7: initialize any sketch variables in r’s update and push them to stack, if they are
not assigned values yet
8: apply update of r
9: else
10: backtrack(stack)
11: return FAILED if stack is empty else restart from line 2
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: return sketch
The algorithm maintains a stack of sketch variables together with the values assigned
to them. Whenever a sketch variable is assigned a value, it ensures that the sketch variable
is pushed to the stack (line 5, 7). For each symbolic event in every scenario, the algorithm
checks consistency of the first matching rule’s actions (line 6). Whenever inconsistency
encountered (line 9), it performs standard backtracking procedure on the stack (line 10-11);
and when it is consistent, the algorithm executes the update of the rule (line 8) and carry
on to the next symbolic event.
2.3.5 Putting It Together
Now we describe the overall synthesis algorithm (Algorithm 6), using the procedures de-
scribed in previous subsections. At a high level, the synthesis algorithm enumerates sketches
by increasing the number of rules, in order to generate a consistent policy table using as few
rules as possible. For each sketch, it invokes Algorithm 5 to search for a consistent policy
using the sketch.
Example. We use the learning switch example in Figure 2.2 to illustrate how Algorithm 6
works. For the scenario in Figure 2.2, the set A contains 2|fields| = 23 = 8 possible reads,
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Algorithm 6 synthesize({SCi})
1: L = generate ordered match list([SCi])
2: let A contain all possible reads
3: for all (c, m) with ascending order of mc do
4: for all subset B ⊂ A with size c do
5: TESTS = {∧i readi.state=vi|∀readi ∈ B, ∀vi ∈ [0, .., m-1]}
6: generate sketch(L, TESTS)
7: if search sketch(sketch) returns a consistent policy table then
8: return the policy table
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
each of which corresponds to a combination of field names, and a state table with the
corresponding type. Because two state tables with the same type can be merged into a
single state table with larger states, we only construct one state table per type. Then the
algorithm constructs a sketch, where each rule has c checks, and its state ranges from 0
to m-1. Thus the generated sketch has mc|L| rules. Note that, when m is 1 or c is 0, the
generated sketch does not use tests essentially, hence enumeration of the pair (c, m) can start
from (1, 2). When picking reads from A (line 4), we pick reads with high dimension first.
As an example for the learning switch, the first generated set B with size 1 in line 4 is
{ST (port,srcmac,dstmac)}, followed by other reads with dimension two.
2.3.6 Additional Heuristics
In addition to the basic synthesis algorithm described above, the synthesizer has imple-
mented other heuristics.
Lazy initialization. Algorithm 5 initializes sketch variables and pushes them to the stack
as soon as applying update of the matching rule. This eager initialization could push irrele-
vant sketch variables to the stack and increase the search depth. For example, the variables
sx2, ux2 in Table 2.4 are not used when checking consistency for any symbolic packet in
Figure 2.2, and hence irrelevant to the consistency checking. Thus, the synthesizer takes a
lazy initialization heuristic. That is, only when an uninitialized sketch variable is read from
state tables, the synthesis algorithm initializes it and pushes it to the stack.
Post processing. After synthesizing a consistent policy, the synthesizer applies additional
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post processing to the policy table in order to simplify the policy table. These includes: (1)
If a rule in the policy table is not matched by any symbolic packet in the input scenarios,
this rule can be removed; (2) The synthesizer removes writes in each rule’s update, if they
do not change the state table; (3) When multiple rules can be merged into one without
causing inconsistency, the synthesizer will merge these rules.
2.4 Policy Execution
Given the synthesized policy, our tool uses the interpreter to process packets on the con-
troller. As described in Section 3.3, the interpreter simply iterates through all rules in the
policy table and picks the first matched rule for the incoming packet. Then it updates all
state tables based on the update of the matched rule, and instructs the switch to apply the
action of the rule to the packet.
While processing packets on the controller is sufficient for executing the policy, it is not
practically efficient and degrades the performance of the network. In this section, we show
how the tool infers flow table rules which can be installed onto switches, thus reducing the
overhead of controller and delay of packet delivery.
Our key observation is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. A packet can be handled on switches if and only if handling this packet on the
controller does not change any state tables.
Indeed, if a packet p is handled on switches, the controller will not be aware of the
packet and thus the state tables remain unchanged. On the other hand, if p is sent to the
controller for execution and the updated state tables remain the same as before, we know
handling p on switches would not affect future packets execution. Therefore, it is sufficient
and necessary to install rules on switches for the packets whose execution will not change
current configuration of state tables.
Based on this observation, we have implemented a reactive installation approach which
installs flow table rules that only match necessary fields. Moreover, to keep the installed
rules up to date, we update installed rules when the policy configuration changes, and
remove invalid rules on switches. Note that, one can also infer flow table rules in a proactive
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way based on this observation. We leave the implementation of proactive approaches to
future work.
Algorithm 7 update flowtable(p)
1: let rule r be the matched rule for p in the policy table
2: if r does not update state tables, or the updated state tables remain unchanged then
3: match← 〈fi1=p.fi1 ,..,fik=p.fik〉, for all field fij appearing in the policy table
4: addmatch→ r.actions to the flow table, if the actions aj applied to p by r is supported
by the switch
5: end if
6: for all installed rule match′ → [a′1, .., a′l] in the flow table do
7: let p′ be a packet matches match′
8: let rule r be the matched rule in the policy table for p′
9: if r does not update state tables or the updated state tables remain unchanged then
10: update the installed rule to match′ → r.actions, if the actions aj applied to p by r
is supported by the switch
11: else
12: remove the installed rule from the flow table
13: end if
14: end for
Algorithm 7 shows the installation strategy. First the algorithm checks whether the
matched rule r for p will change the configuration of state tables. The rule r will not
change the configuration, if r does not have writes, or the updated states and values remain
the same as the old ones (line 2). If executing p would not change the configuration, the
algorithm installs a flow table rule match→ [a1, .., al] onto the switch, where match specifies
the values for fields related to the policy, and aj ’s are the actions that should be applied to
p (line 3-4). The algorithm also needs to check whether previously installed rules are still
correct. For this, the algorithm repeats a similar process for each installed rule (line 6-14).
Example. Revisit the example run in Figure 2.4. By the interpreter’s algorithm shown in
Figure 2.3, the first packet is processed on the controller, and the state table is updated
to the one shown in subfigure (c). Applying Algorithm 7, the matching rule r for p1
would be the first rule in the policy table shown in Table 2.1. Since port 2 is already
remembered for the srcmac A, r would not change the state table. Therefore, a flow table
rule fr1 = 〈port=2,srcmac=A,dstmac=B〉 →flood, which matches the port, srcmac and
dstmac of p1 is pushed down to the switch. After processing the second packet p2, the
state table is updated as in subfigure (d) and a flow table rule matching p2 can be pushed
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down. Moreover, the algorithm checks the installed flow table rule fr1. Since now p1 would
match the second rule in the policy table, and the applied action to p1 is different from the
installed flow table rule, the action of fr1 is updated to send(1).
2.5 Use Cases
In this section, we demonstrate scenario-based programming for four policies. For each
policy, we will show the packet-type we use, the scenarios that can be used to synthesize
the desired policy, and the policy table generated from the scenarios. To this end, we
manually validate that the synthesized policy is the correct policy. One can also formally
verify the correctness of the generated policy against logical specifications using control
plane verification tools such as Vericon [20] and Nice [27]. We plan to explore light-weight
verification tools for the custom policy abstraction in the future.
2.5.1 Learning Switch
First, we revisit our motivating example. Recall that we can program the learning switch
application for a single switch using a scenario in Figure 2.2. Now we show how to adapt the
scenario to program the learning switch for a network. That is, the policy needs to maintain
the port of each switch for hosts. To program this policy, we need a field specifying which
switch the packet is located. Therefore, we use the packet-type 〈switch : SWITCH, port
: PORT, srcmac : MAC ADDR, dstmac : MAC ADDR 〉. For the scenario, we simply add the
switch field to each symbolic packet in the scenario in Figure 2.2. This modified scenario
suffices for NetEgg to synthesize the network-wide learning switch policy. The scenario and
synthesized policy table is shown in Figure 2.8 and Table 2.5.
scenario 1:
s1,P1,h1,h2⇒ flood
s1,P2,h3,h1⇒ send(P1)
s1,P3,h2,h3⇒ send(P2)
Figure 2.8: Scenario-based program for the learning switch.
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match test actions update
* ST (switch,dstmac).state=0 flood
ST (switch,srcmac)
:=(1, port)
* ST (switch,dstmac).state=1
send(ST (switch,
dstmac).value)
ST (switch,srcmac)
:=(1, port)
Table 2.5: The policy table for the learning switch.
2.5.2 Stateful Firewall
Now, we show how to use scenarios to program stateful firewall policies inductively.
First firewall. First, we consider a stateful firewall which protects hosts connecting to port
1 by blocking untrusted traffic from port 2. The firewall should allow all outbound packets
from port 1, and only allow inbound packets from port 2 if the sender of the packet has
received packets from the receiver before. For this policy, we use the packet-type 〈port:PORT,
srcip:IP ADDR, dstip:IP ADDR〉. We start by giving two of the most intuitive scenarios shown
in Figure 2.9. In the first scenario, the switch blocks the traffic from port 2, and the second
scenario demonstrates the case where the firewall allows the traffic from port 2. It turns out
that these two scenarios are sufficient to generate the desired policy, shown in Table 2.6.
scenario 1:
2,h2,h1⇒ drop
scenario 2:
1,h1,h2⇒ send(2)
2,h2,h1⇒ send(1)
Figure 2.9: Scenario-based program for the first stateful firewall.
match test actions update
port=1 True send(2) ST (dstip,srcip):=(1, -)
port=2 ST (srcip,dstip).state=0 drop -
port=2 ST (srcip,dstip).state=1 send(1) -
Table 2.6: The policy table for the first stateful firewall.
Second firewall. Now suppose we want to specify a policy such that it allows inbound
traffic if the sender has received packets from any protected hosts before. One may notice
that the policy should maintain a state for each host, instead of a pair of hosts. Using the
scenario-based programming, we can simply adapt scenarios from Figure 2.9 and change
the dstip of the second packet in scenario 2, as following:
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modified scenario 2:
1,h1,h2⇒ send(2)
2,h2,h3⇒ send(1)
Figure 2.10: The modified scenario for the second stateful firewall.
The synthesized policy maintains a 1-dimension state table, and is shown in Table 2.7.
match test actions update
port=1 True send(2) ST (dstip):=(1, -)
port=2 ST (srcip).state=0 drop -
port=2 ST (srcip).state=1 send(1) -
Table 2.7: The policy table for the second stateful firewall.
Third firewall. While we mostly focus on packetin events, NetEgg can be generalized to
handle arbitrary events. In this use case, we will demonstrate how to use fields in symbolic
packets to handle user-defined network events. Suppose we want to further implement
a policy such that inbound traffic is allowed until a timeout event indicates the sender
expires. For the policy, we need to handle a timeout event, and the expired host ip specified
in the event. We can use a packet-type 〈event:EVENT, eventip:IP ADDR, srcip:IP ADDR, dstip:
IP ADDR〉. Here, the field named event specifies the type of the network event, and the field
named eventip specifies the expired host. These two fields are set by the corresponding field
handlers. For this policy, we can add one more scenario exhibiting the behavior of timeout,
as in Figure 2.11. The first symbolic packet is similar to above, but since this is a packetin
event, its eventip field is not applicable (we use - to denote its value). The second symbolic
packet is the timeout event, which specifies that host h2 is expired. Since the controller
does not need to apply any actions to this event, we use nop for its action. The third packet
from host h2 now gets dropped. Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 can be adapted similarly from
Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 respectively.
scenario 3:
packetin,-,1,h1,h2⇒ send(2)
timeout,h2,-,-⇒ nop
packetin,-,2,h2,h3⇒ drop
Figure 2.11: The added scenario for the third stateful firewall.
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Given the three scenarios, the desired policy can be synthesized, as in Table 2.8.
match test actions update
event=packetin,
port=1
True send(2) ST (dstip):=(1, -)
event=packetin,
port=2
ST (srcip).state=0 drop -
event=packetin,
port=2
ST (srcip).state=1 send(1) -
event=timeout True nop ST (eventip):=(0,-)
Table 2.8: The policy table for the third stateful firewall.
2.5.3 TCP Firewall
In this use case, we use scenarios to program the TCP firewall that tracks the state transition
of TCP handshake protocol, and only allows packets that follow the protocol. We use the
packet-type that contains 5 fields: 〈flag:TCP FLAG, srcip:IP ADDR, dstip: IP ADDR, srcport:
TCP PORT, dstport: TCP PORT〉.
We first specify two scenarios describing two allowed packet traces by the TCP firewall
in Figure 2.12. A trivial policy which allows all packets would be generated. Next, we
add two scenarios describing packets which should be denied by the firewall. Checking the
policy, we find an undesired behavior of the generated policy, which allows the second packet
in scenario 5. We add the correct behavior as in scenario 5, and the synthesizer generates
the desired policy. The generated policy table is shown in Table 2.9, and the state table
maintains states for each tuple of srcip,dstip,srcport and dstport.
2.5.4 ARP Proxy
In this use case, we use user-defined action primitives to program the ARP proxy in
scenarios. An ARP proxy caches MAC addresses associated with IP addresses, and re-
sponds to ARP requests when the requested MAC is known. We use the packet-type 〈
srcmac:MAC ADDR, arpop:ARP OP, srcip:IP ADDR, dstip:IP ADDR〉 to specify this use case. The
first scenario we provide is similar to the scenario for the learning switch example. In
addition, we provide another scenario which describes learning srcmac from ARP reply
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scenario 1:
SYN,ip1,ip2,port1,port2⇒ allow
ACK,ip2,ip1,port2,port1⇒ allow
scenario 2:
SYN,ip1,ip2,port1,port2⇒ allow
SYNACK,ip2,ip1,port2,port1⇒ allow
ACK,ip1,ip2,port1,port2⇒ allow
scenario 3:
ACK,ip1,ip2,port1,port2⇒ deny
scenario 4:
SYNACK,ip2,ip1,port2,port1⇒ deny
scenario 5:
SYN,ip1,ip2,port1,port2⇒ allow
ACK,ip1,ip2,port1,port2⇒ deny
Figure 2.12: Scenario-based program for the TCP firewall.
match test actions update
flag=SYN True allow
ST (dstip,dstport,srcip,
srcport):=(1,-)
flag=SYNACK
ST (srcip,srcport, dstip,
dstport).state=0
deny -
flag=SYNACK
ST (srcip,srcport, dstip,
dstport).state=1
allow
ST (dstip,dstport,srcip,
srcport):=(1,-)
flag=ACK
ST (srcip,srcport, dstip,
dstport).state=0
deny -
flag=ACK
ST (srcip,srcport,dstip,
dstport).state=1
allow -
Table 2.9: The policy table for the TCP firewall.
messages. Note that in the scenarios, we use the user-defined action primitive reply, which
should construct an ARP reply message with the requested MAC address.
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scenario 1:
h1,request,ip1,ip2⇒ flood
h3,request,ip3,ip1⇒ reply(h1)
h4,request,ip4,ip3⇒ reply(h3)
scenario 2:
h2,reply,ip2,ip1⇒ flood
h3,request,ip3,ip2⇒ reply(h2)
Figure 2.13: Scenario-based program for the ARP proxy.
match test actions update
arpop=
request
ST (dstip).state=0 flood
ST (srcip)
:=(1,srcmac)
arpop=request ST (dstip).state=1 reply(ST (dstip).value)
ST (srcip)
:=(1,srcmac)
arpop=reply True flood
ST (srcip)
:=(1,srcmac)
Table 2.10: The policy table for the ARP proxy.
2.6 Evaluation
We have developed a prototype of NetEgg written in Python. We evaluate NetEgg along
two dimensions: (1) the feasibility of NetEgg in its ability to implement a range of SDN
policies [20, 55, 68], (2) the performance and overhead of the synthesized policies, and
finally, (3) correctness of the flow table rule installation strategy.
2.6.1 Feasibility
We explore two aspects of feasibility of NetEgg. First, is the policy generation process
efficient in terms of execution time? Second, is NetEgg easy to use, in terms of the number
of input scenarios required and lines of configuration code?
Table 2.11 summarizes our findings in terms of execution time and scenario size. We
report the total number of events in the scenarios used to program each policy, and the
number of scenarios. We also report the computation time of the synthesizer to generate
the policy from scenarios.
We make the observation that most of the scenarios are expressed in less than 5 events,
with some outliers requiring up to 10 events. NetEgg is also efficient, and in all examples,
requires no more than 402 ms.
We further perform a “code size” comparison, by counting the number of lines in each
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#EV #SC Time Description
maclearner1 3 1 11 ms The illustrative example.
maclearner2 3 1 15 ms Section 2.5.1.
auth 3 2 13 ms
Deny traffic from hosts unless the hosts are
authenticated (adapted from [3]).
gardenwall 5 3 52 ms
Deny, allow or redirect traffic from a host
based on its state (adapted from [3]).
ids 3 2 15 ms
Deny traffic from infected hosts detected by
IDS (adapted from [3]).
monitor 3 2 13 ms
Monitor a host’s traffic based on external
input events (adapted from [3]).
ratelimiter 10 5 147 ms
Forward flows using different links based ex-
ternal rate limiting event (adapted from [3]).
serverlb 7 3 143 ms
Forward traffic from hosts to a single port or
forward traffic of each host to a pre-chosen
port (input as an external event) for load
balancing (adapted from [3]).
stateful firewall1 3 2 12 ms The first use case in Section 2.5.2.
stateful firewall2 3 2 16 ms The second use case in Section 2.5.2.
stateful firewall3 6 3 107 ms The third use case in Section 2.5.2.
trafficlb 7 3 402 ms
Similar to serverlb, but considers traf-
fic from source-destination pairs (adapted
from [3]).
ucap 3 2 13 ms
Block traffic from hosts based on the user’s
input (adapted from [3]).
vmprov 3 2 24 ms
Forward a host’s flow to a primary or a
backup server (adapted from [3]).
TCP firewall 9 5 64 ms Section 2.5.3.
ARP proxy 5 2 49 ms Section 2.5.4.
Table 2.11: Network policies generated from scenarios. #SC is the number of scenarios
used to synthesize the policy, #EV is the total number of events in scenarios, Time is the
running time of the synthesizer.
of our NetEgg example configurations, and compare with corresponding policies that we
implemented in Pyretic and POX. Table 2.12 summarizes our results. We observe that
NetEgg is more concise, achieving a 4× and 10× reduction in code size compared with
Pyretic and POX.
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NetEgg Pyretic POX
maclearner2 3 17 29
stateful firewall1 3 21 58
TCP firewall 9 24 68
Table 2.12: Lines of code to implement policies in different programming abstractions. We
report the total number of events in scenarios for NetEgg, lines of code for Pyretic and
POX implementations.
2.6.2 Performance Overhead
NetEgg uses the policy table as the policy abstraction, and a generic interpreter to execute
the policy table. Unlike hand-crafted implementations which can be customized to policies,
generic execution of our abstraction of policies may incur additional overhead. We evaluate
the generic execution engine of NetEgg using a combination of targeted benchmarks and
end-to-end evaluation.
Cbench Evaluation
We first use the Cbench [86] tool to evaluate the response time of three policy implementa-
tions.
Experiments. We emulate one switch in Cbench, which sends one packet-in request
to the controller as soon as it receives a reply for last sent request. The response time
corresponds to the time between sending out a request and receiving its reply, which hence
includes the execution time of policy implementations. For comparison, we also evaluate
the policies’ implementations in POX.
Results. Figure 2.14 shows the response time for the policy implementations in POX
and NetEgg. We note that in all cases, the differences in response times between the
POX and NetEgg versions are within 12%. In the case of MAC learning and stateful
firewall, the differences are negligible (<1%). We observe that the response time between
implementations in POX and NetEgg is comparable, which suggests our policy abstraction
incurs reasonably small overhead on execution.
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Figure 2.14: Response time for POX and NetEgg implementations.
End-to-end Performance
Our next set of experiments aim to validate that the synthesized implementation closely
matches the hand-crafted implementation on end-to-end performance for network applica-
tions such as HTTP.
Experiments. We emulate a fattree topology [15] in Mininet, which consists of 20
switches and 16 hosts. We setup a HTTP server on one host, and run httperf on all other
hosts as clients. Httperf sends HTTP requests from the clients to the server, and measures
the HTTP connection time for each request, which is the time between a TCP connection
is initiated and it is closed. We run httperf with different rates of sending requests, and the
same number of connections (e.g. at rate 5 request/second, httperf issues 5 requests per
client). Each run starts from the initial network state. On the controller side, we run the
MAC learner policy using two implementations: POX and NetEgg.
Results. Figure 2.15 reports the average connection time over all 15 clients. The
x-axis is the rate of HTTP requests issued by the clients. As expected, the connection
time under the NetEgg implementation matches closely to that under hand-crafted POX
implementation. These results suggest our synthesized implementation is able to achieve
comparable end-to-end performance as hand-crafted implementations. This also further
verifies that execution of our policy abstraction incurs small overhead, and our flow table
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rule installation is efficient.
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Figure 2.15: HTTP connection time.
2.6.3 Rule Installation
To achieve realistic performance, our interpreter infers and installs flow table rules. We
validate the correctness of our rule installation strategy using emulation-based experiments.
Experiments. We run the synthesized MAC learner policy on the controller, and
emulate a simple topology with a single switch connected with 300 hosts in Mininet [59].
We partition these hosts into two groups, with 150 hosts per group. Every host in a group
sends 100 ping messages to another host in the other group with 1 message per second.
For comparison, we run the set of experiments under two settings, one with flow table
installation and one without.
Results. We plot the average RTT for all ping messages over time in Figure 2.16.
The red line corresponds to the policy implementation without installing flow table rules.
This implementation has a high RTT consistently over time, due to the fact that every
packet is sent to the controller. The blue line corresponds to the case with installation. We
observe that only the first message experiences high latency, and subsequent messages has
significantly smaller RTT below 0.1 ms. This fact suggests that our installation strategy is
able to infer flow table rules from the first incoming packet-in event, and correctly install
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the rules onto the switch. Hence, subsequent packets are all processed by the switch.
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Figure 2.16: Effects of flow table rule installation.
2.7 User Study
To understand the feasibility of the proposed approach in practice, we conducted a user
study involving 12 master and PhD students, all majored in Computer and Information
Science, in the fall semester of 2015. In this section, we describe the main results we found
in the user study.
2.7.1 Setup
In this user study, we asked the students to program three SDN policies: the stateful firewall,
the learning switch, and the TCP firewall. All students were required to program these
policies in both POX and NetEgg. For students who may not know how to program SDN
using POX, we refer them to the online resources on programming in POX [5, 6, 8, 11, 59],
and they needed to learn the use of POX. We developed a web-based GUI for NetEgg.
Figure 2.17 shows a snapshot of the GUI. This GUI allowed the students to draw the
scenarios, and then presented the generated policy table in a visual way. We prepared a
webpage of basic instructions on NetEgg for the students’ reference.
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Figure 2.17: Web-based GUI of NetEgg.
To quantify the feasibility of NetEgg, we considered two major objectives. First, we
measured how much time the students spent on each programming assignment using both
POX and NetEgg. For this measurement, we asked all students to time the programming
time of each programming assignment by themselves, and submit it along with the assign-
ments. Second, we measured how intuitive of NetEgg the students found compared to POX.
For this metric, we asked the students to report how much time they spent in learning the
programming of POX and NetEgg. Moreover, we asked the students to rate the “intuitive-
ness” of POX and NetEgg after all programming assignments, from score 0 (least intuitive)
to 10 (most intuitive).
2.7.2 Results
Programming time
Figure 2.18 shows the average programming time of the three policies in POX and NetEgg.
We make the following two observations.
First, NetEgg may reduce the programming time for some policies. Specifically, we
observed that NetEgg was able to reduce the programming time of the first two network
policies by 50% and 72%, respectively. To understand why NetEgg was able to achieve
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Figure 2.18: Programming time comparison.
this reasonably good reduction in programming time, we further analyzed the programs the
students wrote. We found that the scenario-based programming approach offered by NetEgg
was able to reduce the manual efforts of writing low-level code. For example, the students
wrote from 29 lines to 150 lines of code for the stateful firewall policy, while they used no
more than 3 scenarios to generate the policy. One of the reasons why the students needed
to write considerably more code in POX is that they needed to handle low-level semantics
offered by POX as well as to come up with imperative code in order to implement the policy,
which could be simplified by NetEgg by allowing them to simply provide the behaviors of
the policy.
Second, NetEgg may result in more programming time on complicated policies. In
particular, the students spent 6% more time in programming the TCP firewall on average
compared to the programming time in POX. This is perhaps not surprising, given that
our heuristics aim at generating the smallest policy that is consistent with the scenarios.
Therefore, as commented by the students on the TCP firewall policy, they spent more time
in coming up with the right scenarios to tweak the generated policy table, even when they
knew what the correct policy table should be. This observation may suggest a plausible
improvement to NetEgg, which is to allow the users to provide additional information (e.g.
the state tables used in the policy) to the synthesizer in order to accelerate the programming
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process.
Intuitiveness
We first report the time the students spent on learning how to program in POX and NetEgg.
Most students indicated that they spent several hours in learning POX, while they spent
less than one hour in learning NetEgg. In particular, 4 out of the 12 students reported
the estimated number of hours they spent in learning. On average, the learning time of
POX is about 2.6 hours, and that of NetEgg is about 0.9 hours. Note that all students
were majored in Computer Science, and had good programming background. We believe
that the reduction of learning time would be greater for the users who may not be trained
in programming. This result suggests that NetEgg comes with a much smoother learning
curve compared to traditional programming approaches such as POX.
Second, we present the “score of intuitiveness” reported by the students. 11 students
reported their scores for POX and NetEgg, with 0 being the least intuitive, and 10 being
the most intuitive. Figure 2.19 shows the scores by the 11 students.
Figure 2.19: The “Score of intuitiveness” rate.
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The average score of POX is 4.7, while the average score of NetEgg is 6.9. Furthermore,
every student rated NetEgg higher than POX. This result suggests NetEgg may be more
intuitive than traditional programming approaches.
The results of the preliminary user study seem promising. The user study suggests that
NetEgg was able to reduce the programming time for 2 out of 3 policies in our user study.
Furthermore, NetEgg was shown to be a more intuitive programming approach.
2.8 Discussion
Policy Correctness. NetEgg generates network policies directly from example behaviors,
which may not cover all possible behaviors of the desired policies. Therefore, while NetEgg
aims at generating a policy which is consistent with all scenarios, NetEgg does not guarantee
the correctness of the generated policy.
To debug/verify the generated policy, there are other orthogonal debugging and veri-
fication tools. For example, one may use ATPG [95] and BUZZ [38] (which is based on
KLEE [26]) to generate test cases for the policy; Vericon [20] and Nice [27] can be used to
verify the correctness of the generated policy.
As one possible future work, it is interesting to explore the feasibility of programming
network policies in a hybrid programming framework similar to the Sketch [80] framework,
in order to ensure the correctness of the generated policy. For example, the user may also
provide the synthesizer the information such as the state tables and the number of states
that should be used, in addition to the example behaviors.
Comparison with CEGIS. In NetEgg, we use customized heuristics for the policy learn-
ing problem, which can also be solved using other program synthesis techniques. As a
comparison, we also implemented a counter-example guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS)
approach [80] using the solver Z3 [35]. We observe that our customized algorithm works
more efficiently. In particular, the CEGIS approach used 371 ms, 536 ms and 281 ms for
the learning switch, stateful firewall and ARP proxy policy, while our customized heuristics
used 11 ms, 12 ms and 49 ms respectively.
Limitations. NetEgg aims at generating stateful policies which can be expressed by our
policy tables. Therefore, NetEgg is not good for policies that are hard to be expressed
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by a policy table. For example, policies such as traffic engineering often require solving
optimization problems, which cannot be synthesized by NetEgg.
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Chapter 3
NetQRE: Specification and
Implementation for Quantitative
Network Policies
Network management today often requires dynamic updates in response to traffic engineer-
ing and security events. For example, in data centers, heavy hitters [16, 91] need to be
detected in real-time and bandwidth limits may be imposed on them. Within an enterprise
network, users can be rate-limited if they exceed quotas on their application usage. Net-
work traffic anomalies that are detected require immediate mitigation strategies to block
potential security attacks [41].
Decisions for such updates are based on quantitative network policies that capture logic
based on a variety of network and application-level performance metrics. Quantitative
network policies involve two aspects: (1) monitoring a variety of network and application-
level performance metrics, and (2) real-time network configuration updates in response to
monitoring results in order to meet performance and security goals.
Today, there are several point-solutions to support certain aspects of quantitative net-
work policies. However, they suffer from one or more of the following limitations. First, a
large majority of network measurement tools focus on flow-level measurements [32, 36, 37,
89, 91, 92] that do not capture application-level or session-level semantics. This precludes
a range of policies that are application-dependent, for example, rate-limiting users based
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on their VoIP call usage. Second, these tools tend to provide ad-hoc solutions that are dif-
ficult to generalize or customize. Recently, programming frameworks for software-defined
networks (SDN) have been proposed, such as Frenetic [40], Pyretic [67], FlowLog [72].
However, they do not support integration with queries beyond basic flow-level counters,
and there is no language support to capture quantitative policies at the application or
session level.
To address the above limitations, in the chapter we present NetQRE, a practical tool
aimed at simplifying the specification and implementation of quantitative network policies.
Our proposal is based on the observation that traffic patterns such as a TCP connection and
a application-level session can be specified using regular expressions, which are an abstrac-
tion that programmers find natural to use, as shown by its usage in network management, for
example, application-level packet classification [2], signature-based attack detection [4, 76].
While preserving the simplicity of regular expressions, our language extends regular expres-
sions in support for quantitative network policies and thus allows programmers to reason
about interactions across packets, and express a variety of quantitative network policies
that span multiple packets grouped into flows and application-level sessions.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. First, we offer an overview of NetQRE in
Section 3.1. To illustrate the features of NetQRE, we provide 3 example programs written
in NetQRE. Second, we present the design of the NetQRE language in Section 3.2. We
describe the high-level constructs in NetQRE for monitoring packet streams. In Section 3.3,
we describe a range of quantitative network policies, and demonstrate how to specify them
using NetQRE. We then describe the compilation algorithm for NetQRE in Section 3.4, in
order to compile specifications in NetQRE to efficient low-level code. We finally describe
the implementation of our NetQRE system in Section 3.5 and the evaluation results in
Section 3.6.
3.1 Overview
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of NetQRE. To program a quantitative network policy,
a programmer views the input as the entire stream of packets, instead of single incoming
packets. The programmer then simply specifies this policy on the input stream in a declar-
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Figure 3.1: NetQRE architecture.
ative fashion. The NetQRE compiler automatically generates efficient low-level imperative
code that implements the specification. At runtime, each incoming packet is parsed, and
headers are extracted into a format that can be referenced within each NetQRE program.
The execution on the packet involves updating any state in the NetQRE runtime, followed
by executing the actual program itself to generate output. The NetQRE tool can be de-
ployed in different settings, for example, a tap on a SPAN port analyzing mirrored traffic,
an inline solution, or running in the cloud as a virtualized middlebox. Our language design
and compiler is agnostic to the deployment setting.
3.1.1 Examples
We present three example NetQRE programs to highlight some of its key features. We start
with a simple example of packet counting, before progressing to more complex ones. The
actual language definition and more complex use cases will be presented in Section 3.2 and
3.3 respectively.
Example 1. In our first example, we consider a simple example of counting the number
of packets seen so far. In an imperative language, one needs to maintain a counter that
remembers the number of all packets, and increment the counter as every packet comes
in. To program in NetQRE, one can simply iterate the stream of packets, and count the
number in a declarative way as shown below:
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sfun int count = iter (/./?1 , sum);
This program defines a stream function, as specified by the keyword sfun. This implicitly
defines an input stream which is the stream of packets. This function outputs a value of
type int, and count is the name of the stream function. There is no explicit argument
specified in the declaration of count . Its body is an expression followed by ‘=’.
To understand the definition of the function, we first explain the expression /./. This
expression defines an enhanced regular expression which we detail in Section 3.2. In this
regular expression, . is a predicate that matches every single packet. A successful match
will return a value of 1.
The outer function iter has two arguments, with the first being the function described
above, and the second an aggregation operator sum. The iter function splits each input
stream into multiple sessions, such that applying its first argument to every session results
in a valid return value, and then sums up all the return values. In this case, since the inner
function returns a valid value 1 when reading a single packet, the iter function iterates all
packets in the stream and applies the inner function. In other words, the whole function
counts the number of packets in the stream.
Example 2. Our second example computes the average number of packets in a TCP
connection between the source IP-port pair (1.2.3.4, 80) and an arbitrary destination
IP-port pair (y, p). For ease of exposition, we assume that all connections start with a
SYN packet and end with a FIN packet in this example. We defer more complex examples
involving sequence numbers to later in Sec. 3.3.
sfun int avg _conn_len(IP y, PORT p) =
filter_tcp(srcip=’1.2.3.4 ’, srcport =80, dstip=y, dstport=p
) >>
iter(tcp_conn_len , avg);
This function uses two expressions separated by the stream composition operator >>. At
a high level, this function first filters all TCP packets with corresponding IPs and ports from
the stream using the function filter_tcp, and applies the second expression to the TCP
packet stream. The second iter expression iterates through all connections in the stream
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and counts the number of packets in every connection using the function tcp_conn_len,
and returns the averaged value.
The function tcp_conn_len calculates the number of packets transmitted in each TCP
connection. The regular expression [syn=1][fin=0]*[fin=1] specifies a TCP connection
pattern, by our assumption for this example. This pattern matches a stream if it starts
with a SYN packet, followed by a sequence of non-FIN packets and ends with a FIN packet.
For a stream that matches this pattern, the function returns the number of packets in the
stream, by using the previously defined function count.
sfun int tcp_conn_len =
/[syn =1][ fin =0]*[ fin =1]/? count;
Example 3. In our third example, we show how to use previously defined functions and
aggregation expressions in NetQRE to compute the largest possible average connection
length among all destination IP-port pairs (y, p). The program has just a single expression,
which calls avg_conn_len on all IP-port pairs, and returns the maximal among all return
values from the calls, as shown below.
sfun int max _conn_len =
max{avg _conn_len(y, p) | IP y, PORT p};
This example is significantly more complex to write in an imperative language. A typical
implementation needs to maintain a state and a counter for each destination IP-port pair,
in order to remember the state of the connection as well as the running count of the number
of packet in the connection. In order to compute the average length, the program needs
to additionally maintain the number of connections. Every time a connection ends, the
imperative program needs to update maximum length over all destination IP-port pairs.
However, with NetQRE, all functionalities can be implemented in an intuitive and concise
way as illustrated above. The complexities of maintaining states and optimization of the
implementation is abstracted away and handled automatically by our compiler.
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3.2 The NetQRE Language
In NetQRE, a packet is modeled as a sequence of bytes, and we use parsing functions
to extract information from the packet. Common parsing functions include srcip which
returns the source IP of the packet, srcport (source port), syn (SYN bit), data (bytes in
payload), and time (the time stamp on receipt of the packet). The parsing functions can
be customized by the user, for example, to extract application-level headers.
Values, variables and functions in NetQRE are typed. NetQRE offers basic types, such
as int, bool, string, as well as a set of domain-specific types, such as IP (IP addresses),
Port (TCP and UDP ports), packet (all packets), and action. The action type consists of
pre-defined functions that either generate alerts or send updates to switches. NetQRE also
provides high-level types such as Conn (tuple of source IP-port and destination IP-port),
which is used for TCP and UDP connections.
NetQRE offers a convenient way to write stream functions to process packet streams.
A stream function takes as input a stream of packets, and produces as output values (e.g.
monitoring results to an application)/ actions (e.g. alerts to the controller) and packets
(e.g. packets filtered from an application). A stream function can be specified as below.
sfun type func_name(type var) = exp;
The stream function declaration includes the keyword sfun, returned type of the stream
function, followed by the name of the function. Any other arguments are specified following
the function name. The body of each stream function (right-hand-side to ’=’) consists of
expressions which are used to specify the functionalities of the stream functions.
Figure 3.2 shows a summary of the syntax of NetQRE expressions. Expressions in
stream functions are based on the theoretical foundations of quantitative regular expressions
(QRE) [18], a novel proposal that integrates regular expressions with numerical computa-
tions. In the rest of this section, we describe the features of NetQRE expressions in stages.
We first introduce how to use an extension to regular expressions to detect patterns of the
input stream. Second, we discuss how to associate values and actions for the stream. Fi-
nally, we describe a set of high-level operations that allow modular programming of stream
functions.
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Predicate P ::= . | [field = value]
| [field = variable]
| P&P | (P ‘||’ P ) | !P
Regular Exp. re ::= P | re re | re * | re ‘||’ re
Conditional cond ::= exp ? exp | exp ? exp : exp
Aggregation agg ::= aggop { exp | type variable }
aggop ::= sum | avg | max | min
Split split ::= split(exp , exp, aggop)
Iteration iter ::= iter(exp, aggop)
Composition comp ::= exp >> exp
Expression exp ::= value | action
| exp op exp | op exp
| re | cond | agg | split | iter | comp
Figure 3.2: Syntax of NetQRE expressions.
3.2.1 Pattern Matching over Streams
The basic feature of NetQRE is to detect the patterns of the input packet stream. As
the basic building block, NetQRE uses an extension of regular expressions, to which we
refer as parameterized symbolic regular expressions (PSRE), for pattern matching over the
input stream. Regular expressions (RE) are widely used for pattern matching over strings
(sequences of bytes). Typically, a RE uses a fixed finite alphabet, and the atoms in a RE
are symbols in the alphabet. In NetQRE, a PSRE generalizes a RE in the two ways.
First, the atoms in a PSRE are predicates over packets instead of single symbols, which
allows a PSRE to handle very large and potentially infinite alphabet. This property makes
PSRE an appealing fit for network policies, since the space of packets is often very large
and typically one is only interested in the values of some fields in a packet (e.g. the source
and destination) instead of the whole packet itself.
Second, PSRE allows the use of parameters to represent unknown values in the pred-
icate. With this generalization, a PSRE can detect a variety of patterns using different
instantiation of the parameters. As a result, it allows the programmer to specify applica-
tions such as counting the number of distinct IP addresses appeared in the stream, which is
hard, if not impossible, to be specified without parameters, because no concrete predicates
can be defined without knowing those IP addresses at runtime.
Predicate. A basic packet predicate [f = v] checks whether the value in the field f of a
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packet is v. As an example, the predicate [srcip=‘1.0.0.1’] matches all packets whose
source IP address is 1.0.0.1. As an example of the use of parameters, [srcip=x] defines
a function from the domain of x (i.e. IP addresses in this case) to a concrete predicate over
packets. We also use . to denote the predicate that matches all packets. Predicates can
be composed using standard boolean combinations. NetQRE also provides handy macros
for widely used predicates. For example, is_tcp(c) is a short-hand for the predicate that
matches a TCP packet in the connection c.
PSRE. Like REs, the basic operations for PSREs are concatenation, union and Kleene
star. For example, /[syn=1][syn=0]*/ matches a stream of packets where the first packet
is a SYN packet followed by a sequence of non-SYN packets (including 0 non-SYN packets).
Note that, syntactically, predicates are enclosed in square brackets and a PSRE is enclosed
in a pair of slashes in NetQRE, and * is the Kleene star operator. To illustrate the use
of parameters, consider the example to count distinct source IP addresses in the stream.
The core PSRE to implement this example is the function exist(x) which checks whether
a source IP x appeared in the stream. The function can be specified using the PSRE as
below.
sfun bool exist(IP x) = /.*[ srcip=x].*/;
We defer the discussion of the full expression for this example in Section 3.2.5.
Semantically, a PSRE defines a function that maps the values of its parameters and the
input stream to a boolean value. Given an instantiation of all parameters in a PSRE using
concrete values, the PSRE accepts a regular set of streams, which defines the domain of the
PSRE under the instantiation.
3.2.2 Conditional Expressions
Given the pattern matching capability for the input stream, it is natural to use condi-
tional expressions to incorporate PSRE with other values and actions in order to assign
cost/generate actions to the stream.
In NetQRE, a conditional expression has the form exp? exp1, where, exp is an expression
that returns boolean values such as a PSRE defined above, and exp1 is an expression
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in NetQRE. A stream evaluated to true by exp will be applied to exp1, otherwise this
expression is not defined and returns undef.
For example, the expression /./?1 returns 1 if the stream matches the PSRE /./ (i.e.
the stream consists of a single packet), otherwise it returns undef; the expression /.*/?
size(last) returns the size of the last packet in the stream. The keyword last denotes the
last received packet in the input stream. As another example, (count>k)?alert returns
an action alert when the total number of packets in the stream is larger than k. Here,
count is a stream function that counts the number of packets in the stream, and alert is
a pre-defined action to generate an alert event, for example, to a controller node.
A conditional expression can also be specified as exp? exp1: exp2, which applies exp2
to the stream if exp is not satisfied. To ensure the consistency, exp1 and exp2 should return
the same type for the stream. As an example, the expression /[srcip=‘1.0.0.1’]/?1:0
returns 1 if the stream contains a single packet with source IP 1.0.0.1, and it returns 0
if the stream contains multiple packets, or the only packet in the stream does not have the
source IP.
Given concrete values of the parameters of a conditional expression exp? exp1, the
domain of it is defined as domain(exp)
⋂
domain(exp1). For the ternary conditional ex-
pressions exp? exp1: exp2, its domain is defined as (domain(exp)
⋂
domain(exp1))
⋃
(domain(exp)
⋂
domain(exp2)).
3.2.3 Stream Split
In many network applications, the input stream consists of multiple phases. For example,
a VoIP call splits into three phases as shown in the motivating example. It is convenient to
handle different phases of the stream separately, and combine the results of each phase in
a modular way. Following the operators defined in Quantitative Regular Expressions [18],
NetQRE uses the split operator to split the stream and compose two stream functions.
A stream split expression has the form split(f,g,aggop), where f and g are two
NetQRE expressions, and aggop is an aggregation operator such as sum, avg (average),
max, and min.
Given concrete values of all parameters, and an input stream ρ, a split function splits
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ρ into two substreams ρ1 and ρ2, such that f is defined on the first substream ρ1 and g is
defined on ρ2. f and g are applied respectively to the two substreams, and the returned
values are aggregated using aggop, as the return value of split(f,g,aggop). The split
operation is a natural quantitative generalization of the concatenation operation in regular
expressions, and Figure 3.3 illustrates how a split expression works.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of split.
Note that, in order to return a unique value for a split expression, it is required that
the splitting is unambiguous. That is, for all input streams and all values of parameters
in the expression, there is at most one way to split stream, such that ρ1 and ρ2 are in the
domain of f and g, respectively. The property of unambiguity can be checked efficiently at
compile time [18]. When no unambiguous splitting is possible, the split expression returns
undef for the input stream.
As an example of split, consider the example of counting the number of packets since
the last SYN packet in the stream. Naturally, one can split the stream into two substreams
separated by the last SYN packet, and count the number of packets in the second substream,
as shown in the following expression.
split(any?0, last_syn?count , sum)
Here, any is the PSRE /.*/ that matches any packet streams, and last_syn is the PSRE
/[syn=1][syn=0]*/ that matches a stream starting with a SYN packet and followed by
non-SYN packets. Putting together, the split expression splits the input stream before
the last appearance of a SYN packet. Note that the first substream is assigned the value
0, while the second substream is applied to the count function which is first introduced in
Section 3.1.1.
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3.2.4 Stream Iteration
A network application often requires to iterate over the input stream. For example, counting
the number of packets in the stream requires to iterate over all single packets.
Similar to the split expression, NetQRE offers the iter operator to iterate over the
stream. An iter expression is of the form iter(f,aggop), where f is an expression in
NetQRE and aggop is an aggregation operator. The iter expression splits the input stream
into multiple substreams, such that f is defined on each substream. It then iterates through
all substreams and evaluates f on each substream, and finally aggregates the return value
on each substream using the aggregation operator. The iter operator is a quantitative
generalization of the Kleene star operation, and Figure 3.4 illustrates this process. Again,
the splitting is required to be unambiguous for all input streams to f.
Figure 3.4: Illustration of iter.
As an example, the function count that counts the number of packets in the stream
sfun int count = iter (/./?1 , sum)
splits the stream into single packets, and the inner expression returns 1 for each single
packet. As a result, the whole iter expression counts how many packets in the stream.
3.2.5 Aggregation over Parameters
Aggregation is a common feature that many policies share. For example, computing the
average flow size needs to aggregate the average size across multiple flows. NetQRE offers
high-level aggregation expressions to aggregate functions over parameters.
Aggregation expressions are of the form aggop{f | T x}, where x is a parameter, with
its type T, and f is an expression where the parameter x appears in it. Intuitively, the aggre-
53
gation expression goes through all possible values of x, and evaluate f using the substituted
value for x, and finally aggregates all valid returned values using the aggregation operator
aggop. Given concrete values for parameters in the aggregation expression ( note that x
is not considered as a parameter in the aggregation expression), it is required that f has
the same domain across all values for x, which is defined as the domain of the aggregation
expression. Revisiting the example of counting distinct source IP addresses in a stream, we
can use the expression sum{exist(x)?1:0 | IP x}. Note that the domain of the expression
exist(x)?1:0 is all the streams, and thus the aggregation expression above is defined on
all input streams.
3.2.6 Stream Composition
Typically the input stream consists of packets from multiple sources and destinations. Of-
tentimes, the programmer only wants to handle a stream from a particular source, for
example. NetQRE offers the stream composition operator >> that allows to preprocess the
stream before applying another stream function.
Stream composition expressions are of the form f >> g where f and g are two stream
functions. The stream composition allows the processing of a stream using the first stream
function f repeatedly on every prefix of the stream, and the returned outputs yield a new
stream that is then piped as the input stream to a second stream function g. For example,
if the stream contains two packets (P1, P2), f is first applied to P1 as a single-packet stream,
and then (P1, P2). The output of f on the two substreams is then piped to g.
Stream composition is useful when the stream of packets need to be preprocessed in
order to filter related packets for further processing. For example, counting the number of
all packets in a TCP connection c can be specified using filter_tcp(c)>> count, which
first filters all TCP packets in the connection c using the function filter_tcp, and then
counts the filtered stream using count. The function filter_tcp is defined as follows:
sfun packet filter_tcp(Conn c) =
/.*[ is_tcp(c)]/? last;
Filter functions are convenient and used extensively in our use cases. As a short-hand,
NetQRE uses filter(p) for the filter function that filters packets satisfying the predicate
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p. For example, the above filter function can be abbreviated as filter(is_tcp(c)).
Stream composition can also be used to filter packets according to timestamps. NetQRE
builds in two filter functions based on timestamps. The recent(t) function filters the
stream in the recent t seconds, and the every(t) function periodically filters the stream
in every t seconds. For example, recent(5)>>count counts the number of packets in the
recent 5 seconds.
3.3 Use Cases
We provide use cases, ranging from flow-level traffic measurements, to complex examples
involving application-level content analysis and dynamic updates.
3.3.1 Flow-level Traffic Measurements
We highlight three measurement tasks that have been proposed recently as a means to do
flow scheduling and attack detection.
Heavy hitter. Heavy hitters [37] are flows that consume bandwidth larger than a threshold
T. A key step to identify a heavy hitter is to count the size of a flow. In this example, we
consider a flow as a source-destination pair. A natural way to specify this functionality is
to first filter all packets from a source x to a destination y, and then count the size of the
filtered stream.
sfun int hh(IP x, IP y) =
filter(srcip=x, dstip=y) >> count_size;
hh first filters packets based on the source and destinations IP, and second, the filtered
stream is piped into count_size which counts the size of all packets in the stream. Due to
space limits, we do not show the definition of count_size which is similar to that of count.
Second, to alert a heavy hitter in real time to the controller, we can use the following
program.
sfun action alert_hh =
(hh(last.srcip , last.dstip)>T) ?
alert(last.srcip , last.dstip);
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The function alert_hh checks for every newly received packet (i.e. last in the stream)
that whether its flow reaches the threshold T, and issues an alert correspondingly. By
further applying the time-based filtering every(5)>>alert_hh, one can detect heavy hitters
in every 5 seconds.
Super spreader. A super spreader [91] is the host that contacts more than k distinct
destinations during a time interval. Like the use case of heavy hitter detection, a key step
is to count how many distinct destinations a source x contacted. The following NetQRE
program does this counting.
sfun int ss(IP x) =
sum{ exist(x, y)?1:0 | IP y};
The function exist(x,y) checks whether the source-destination pair (x,y) appeared
in the stream. The ss function uses an aggregation function sum to aggregate all possible
destinations, and thus gives the total number of distinct destination addresses x contacted.
Similar to heavy hitter detection, we can use stream composition to filter the input
stream based on time as well as traffic types.
Entropy Estimation. This case measures the entropy of the traffic [58], defined as
−∑i fi log fi, where fi is the frequency of the appearance of an IP address. We first
need to count the number of packets from a source x, and then compute the frequency as
follows.
sfun int num_pkts_from(IP x) =
filter(srcip=x) >> count;
sfun int freq(IP x) =
num_pkts_from(x) / count;
Note that the function count in num_pkts_from only counts the number of packets from
source x, while it counts the number of packets in the entire stream in the function freq.
Now the entropy is computed following its definition, as in the following program.
sfun int entropy =
-sum{freq(x)*log(freq(x)) | IP x};
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3.3.2 TCP State Monitoring
We next showcase applications that rely on monitoring the states within a TCP flow.
SYN flood attacks. In this example, NetQRE is used to detect SYN flood attacks by
counting the number of incomplete TCP handshakes in a time interval. We consider an
incomplete TCP handshake as a packet trace consisting of a SYN packet and a SYNACK
packet, with corresponding sequence number and acknowledge number, but does not have
a further ACK packet to complete the handshake. As the key step, the following program
counts the number of incomplete handshakes, assuming that the input stream consists of
TCP packets between the same source and destination.
sfun int bad_tcp_pat(int x, int y) =
concat(syn(x), synack(y,x+1), no_ack(y+1));
sfun int incomplete_handshake_num =
sum{bad_tcp_pat(x,y)?1 | int x, int y};
The function bad_tcp_pat specifies the pattern of an incomplete handshake: there is
a SYN packet with a sequence number x in the stream, followed by a SYNACK packet
with acknowledge number x+1 and sequence number y, and then followed by packets that
do not include an ACK with acknowledge number y+1 to complete the handshake. The
sum aggregation in incomplete_handshake sums up the number of appearances of such
patterns for all x and y. Using the stream composition of filtering functions based on time
and packet type, the complete function can be specified as follows:
sfun int syn_flood(Conn c) =
recent (5) >>
filter_tcp(c) >>
incomplete_handshake_num >T?block(c.srcip);
Completed flows. Our next example counts the number of legitimate flows that are
completed, delineated by a SYN at the beginning, and ending with a FIN. Note that the
last iter uses the regular expression which matches a stream ending with a SYN and a
FIN packets, and no SYN-FIN pairs appear before. Therefore, the iter expression splits
the entire (filtered) stream into sessions where each session contains exactly one complete
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flow.
sfun int count_flow(Conn c) =
filter_tcp(c) >>
filter(flag=SYN || flag=FIN) >>
iter (/[ fin =1]*[ syn =1]*[ syn =1][ fin =1]/?1 , sum);
3.3.3 Application-level Monitoring
Our final example revisits the Voice-over-IP (VoIP) usage use case.
Let us first focus on the function to monitor the usage of a VoIP call based on a SIP
connection sip_conn and media connection m_conn. Recall that a VoIP call consists of
three phases; and a modular programming way is to handle the three phases using three
stream functions, and then compose them using the split operator. The function is shown
below.
sfun int usage_per_call(Conn sip_conn , Conn m_conn , string
user , string id) =
split(init(id ,user ,m_conn)?0,
call(m_conn)?count_size ,
end(id)?0, sum);
Here, init, call and end are simply the PSREs that capture the patterns of each phase.
Note that the init and the end phase return a value 0, and only the usage of the call phase
is counted, as required.
Next, a programmer can view the traffic using the SIP connection sip_conn and the
media connection m_conn as a sequence of calls. Using the iter operator, the programmer
can easily aggregate the usage of all calls in the traffic, as shown below.
sfun int usage_per_conn(Conn sip_conn , Conn m_conn , string
user , string id) =
filter_sip(sip_conn , m_conn , user , id) >>
iter(split(any?0, usage_per_call(sip_conn , m_conn , user ,
id), sum),sum);
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Note that we first filter all traffic that belongs to sip_conn or m_conn, in order to get the
stream of interest. This filtering may result in non-VoIP traffic between two VoIP calls, and
thus we simply compose the PSRE any with usage_per_call inside the iter expression,
to handle any traffic between two calls.
Now we can aggregate the usage for each user across multiple connections and calls
using the aggregation operation, and further compute the average usage over all users, as
shown below.
sfun int usage_per_user(string user) =
sum{usage_per_conn(sip_conn , m_conn , user , id) | Conn
sip_conn , Conn m_conn , string id};
sfun int average_usage =
avg{usage_per_user(u) | string u};
Suppose we need to send an alert to the controller if a user’s usage is larger than five
times of average usage, we can simply specify the policy as below.
sfun action alert_high_usage(string user) =
(usage_per_user(user) > 5* average_usage) ? alert(user);
3.4 Compilation Algorithm
We next describe how to compile a NetQRE program into an efficient executable that can
run with low memory footprint. Typically the stream of packets is very large, thus it is
not feasible to store the entire stream of packets. Therefore, the compiled program should
evaluate incrementally on each single incoming packet without storing the history of the
stream. To achieve this goal, we have to address the following challenges. First, the compiled
program needs to maintain parameters in NetQRE in a succinct way. Second, in order to
implement the semantics of split and iter, these operations have to be performed in a
single online pass over streaming packets. Lastly, the compiled program needs to handle
aggregation expressions over parameters.
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3.4.1 Compilation of PSRE
First, we describe the algorithm for compiling a PSRE, as the basic building block for
stream functions. Similar to traditional RE, a PSRE can be translated to an equivalent
finite state machine, which we refer to as parameterized symbolic automaton (PSA). For
example, consider the following PSRE /.*[srcip=x].*/. Intuitively this PSRE checks
whether there exists a packet with source IP x in the stream. Its corresponding PSA is
shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: An example PSA.
However, PSA cannot be directly updated due to its uninstantiated parameters. To
illustrate this challenge, consider a naive solution which is to instantiate the parameters
using all possible values, and maintain all the instantiated state machines, namely symbolic
automata (SA), for each instantiation of the parameters. When reading an input packet,
we update all the instantiated SA in the standard way. However, it is not hard to note that
this approach is not feasible due to the large space of parameters. As an example, the PSA
in Figure 3.5 with a single IP parameter has up to 232 instantiated symbolic automata.
Whereas at runtime, the function only needs to store the source addresses that appeared in
the stream, which can be significantly less than 232.
To address this challenge, we propose a new algorithm that updates PSA on-demand.
As the high-level idea, suppose we instantiated a PSA to a set of SA using all possible
instantiations. Notice that even though there is a large space of instantiated SA, however,
many of them will keep the same states at runtime given a stream of packets. As an example,
consider feeding a first packet with the source IP 1.0.0.1 to all SA instantiated from the
PSA in Figure 3.5. It is easy to see that the only SA that will transition to state q1 is the
one where x is instantiated by 10.0.0.1; and all other SA will stay at q0.
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Therefore, the compiled program at runtime maintains guarded states for the PSA, where
a guarded state is pair (s, φ). Here, φ is a predicate of the parameters in the PSA (which
we will refer as a guard), and s is a state in PSA. The pair (s, φ) means that when reading
the input stream, all instantiated SA will be at state s, if they are instantiated by the values
satisfying φ. For example, initially there is only one guarded state maintained for the PSA
in Figure 3.5, which is (q0, true), meaning that all instantiated SA is at the initial state q0
of the PSA.
To update the PSA, the key step is to update each guarded state dynamically when
reading packets from the stream. The updating algorithm for a guarded state is shown in
Algorithm 8. This algorithm iterates through all transitions from the state s, and for the
Algorithm 8 update psa((s, φ), packet)
1: for all transitions originated from s do
2: let t be the destinate state, and P be the parameterized predicate
3: let T be the guard instantiated from P using the packet
4: let φ′ = φ ∧ T
5: emit (t, φ′) if φ 6=false
6: end for
predicate (with parameters) P on the transition, it instantiates P using the current packet
it receives in the stream. This step simply replaces the function name in P by the return
value of it on the packet. The obtained predicate T is a predicate over the parameters in
the PSA. Finally, the algorithm emits a new pair (t, φ′) if φ′ is not false. Intuitively, this
step accounts the fact that the instantiated SA under φ′ will transition to the next state t.
Using Algorithm 8, the overall updating algorithm is straightforward. Initially, the
compiled program only contains a guarded state (q0, true), where q0 is the initial state of
the PSA. Every time reading a new packet from the stream, we call Algorithm 8 on every
guarded state, and the new guarded states consists of all the ones emitted from Algorithm 8.
To check the state given concrete values for parameters, we simply go through all maintained
guarded states, and return the state if the guard is satisfied.
Example. Using the example in Figure 3.5, we illustrate the execution of Algorithm 8
given the pair (q0, true) and the packet with source IP 10.0.0.1. Consider the transition
from q0 to q1. By substituting srcip in the predicate with the source IP of the packet, we
get the guard T which is x=10.0.0.1. Since φ is true now, φ′ is simply x=10.0.0.1. At the
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end, the algorithm will emit the pair (q1, x=10.0.0.1). Similarly, for the other transition
the algorithm emit the pair (q0, x!=10.0.0.1). Therefore, there are two new guarded
states, namely, (q1, x=10.0.0.1) and (q0, x!=10.0.0.1). The updated guarded states
account for the fact that 10.0.0.1 has appeared and thus the corresponding instantiated
SA transitioned to state q1.
3.4.2 Compilation of split
We next discuss how to compile a split expression which is of the form split(f, g,
aggop). First, we highlight the key insight from [18] to compile split without parameters,
and then describe how to generalize this idea to compile split with parameters.
Without parameters. The challenge of compiling split is to split the stream dynamically
at runtime without revisiting the entire history of the stream. For example, in the split
example in Section 3.2.3, we need to split the stream at the last appearance of the SYN
packet. A natural way to implement the semantics of split is to maintain all cases to
split the stream. For example, Figure 3.6 shows two cases to split the stream consisting
of a non-SYN and a SYN packet at runtime for the example in Section 3.2.3. Moreover,
the following two observations ensure that the compiled code only uses a constant space.
First, each case can be represented using a triple (sf , sg, F ), where F is a flag indicating
whether the stream is split, and sf (sg, resp.) is the state of f(g, resp.) on evaluating the
prefix(suffix, resp.) of the stream. Second, the number of maintained cases is bounded by
a constant only related to g at any time point.
Figure 3.6: Example run of split.
With parameters. Similar to PSRE compilation, in the general case, we need to maintain
guarded cases. That is, we maintain a set of (T , φ) pairs, where T is a triple (sf , sg, F )
corresponding to a case as defined above, and φ is a guard. It means that if the parameters
are instantiated by values satisfying φ, there is a case of splitting the stream, which can be
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represented as T .
Algorithm 9 shows the algorithm to update a pair (T , φ). The algorithm feeds the input
Algorithm 9 update split((T , φ), packet)
1: suppose T = (sf , sg, F )
2: if F is false then
3: for all emitted (s′f , φ
′) from update f((sf , φ), packet) do
4: if f is defined on s′f then
5: emit ((s′f , s
0
g, true), φ
′)
6: end if
7: emit ((s′f , sg, false), φ
′)
8: end for
9: else
10: for all emitted (s′g, φ′) from update g((sg, φ), packet) do
11: emit ((sf , s
′
g, true), φ
′)
12: end for
13: end if
packet to f or g corresponding to whether the stream has been split as indicated by F . For
example, consider the else branch from line 10 to 12 in the algorithm. In the branch, we
need to update (sg,φ) using g’s updating procedure, which may emit a set of guarded states
of g. Correspondingly, the guard needs to be refined.
Given concrete values of parameters, evaluating a split expression is as follows. First,
we check if there exist a guarded case ((sf , sg, F ),φ) such that φ is satisfied and both f
and g are defined on the states in the case, then we evaluate the expression on the case.
Otherwise, the expression is not defined.
3.4.3 Compilation of iter
Recall that an iter(f, aggop) expression needs to split the stream into multiple sub-
streams, such that on each substream, f is defined. We first discuss the compilation in
the case without parameters, and then discuss the compilation algorithm for the case with
parameter.
Without parameters. Similar to the compilation of split, the state of the expression
to maintain is a set of pairs corresponding to all cases to split the stream, each of which
consists of (val, sf ), where val is the running aggregated value, and sf is a state of f.
Initially, the state is (v0,s
0
f ), where v0 is an initial value based on the aggregation operator
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aggop. For example, v0 is 0 when the aggregation operator is sum; and v0 is a pair (0,0) if
aggop is avg, where the first 0 indicates the running sum, and the second 0 indicates the
running count of the number of elements. At a high level, to update a pair (val, sf ), every
time receiving a packet, we need to update sf by f’s updating function. When sf reaches
a defined state (i.e. f evaluates to a defined value on sf ), f is evaluated and we add a new
pair (val′, s0f ), where val
′ is new aggregated value using val and the evaluated value from f
using aggop, and s0f is the initial state of f. To evaluate the iter function, we go through
all pairs and pick the one (val,sf ) where sf is defined, and output the aggregated value.
With parameters. Similarly, for an iter expression with parameters, the guarded case is
a pair (T , φ), where T is a pair (v, sf ), and φ is a predicate of its parameters. Initially the
guarded case is ((v0, s
0
f ),true). Algorithm 10 shows the algorithm for updating a guarded
case.
Algorithm 10 update iter((T , φ), packet)
1: suppose T = (v, sf )
2: for all emitted (s′f , φ
′) from update f((sf , φ),packet) do
3: if s′f is defined then
4: let v′ be the evaluated value of f on s′f
5: emit ((v′′, s0f ), φ
′), where v′′ is the aggregated value of v and v′ using aggop
6: end if
7: emit ((v, s′f ), φ
′)
8: end for
Example. We illustrate how to update the following expression iter(/[srcip!=x]*[
srcip=x]/?1,sum) on a 3-packet stream, where each packet has source IP address A, B, A,
respectively. The state machine for the inner PSRE is shown in Figure 3.7(a), Initially, there
is one guarded case ((0,q0),true), standing for the fact that for all values of x, the aggregated
sum is 0, and the state for the inner expression is q0. Reading the first packet, we need
to update (q0,true) using Algorithm 8, which emits (q0,x!=A) and (q1,x==A). Furthermore,
since q1 is final state, we can split the stream, and aggregate the sum. Thus, we add a
new guarded case ((1,q0),x==A). Figure 3.7(b) shows the maintained guarded cases after
reading each packet. The arrows between two guarded cases stand for the fact that the
latter guarded case is emitted from the former one.
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Figure 3.7: Example run of iter.
3.4.4 Compilation of Aggregation
Now we describe the aggregation function aggop{f | T x}. Followed by the definition
of the aggregation function, an aggregation function maintains guarded states (sf ,φ). To
update the aggregation expression, we just need to update each guarded state using f
’s updating procedure. To illustrate the evaluation procedure, suppose the aggregation
operator is sum. Given values for the parameters, we need to iterate through all guarded
states (sf ,φ). If φ is satisfied, we evaluate f on sf , say the return value is v; and count the
number of values of x which satisfies φ, say it is k; we sum up v ∗ k into the aggregated
sum. For other aggregation operators, the evaluation process works similarly.
3.4.5 Compilation of Stream Composition
Lastly, we discuss stream composition. Recall that stream composition allows to process
the input stream using a function f, and then apply the second function g on the processed
stream. Following its definition, each time a new packet arrives, we need to first process it
with f, and the returned value (e.g. a filtered packet) is then fed into g. A guarded state
it maintains is ((sf , sg), φ), where sf and sg is a state of f and g respectively. The initial
guarded state is ((s0f , s
0
g), true), which stands for the fact that for all instantiations, f and
g are in their initial state. Algorithm 11 shows the algorithm to update a guarded state.
To evaluate the expression, we return the value of evaluating g on sg, where sg is from the
guarded state ((sf ,sg),φ), and the guard φ is satisfied.
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Algorithm 11 update comp((S, φ), packet)
1: suppose S = (sf , sg)
2: for all emitted (s′f , φ
′) from update f((sf , φ),packet) do
3: if f is defined on s′f then
4: let ret be the returned value of f on s′f
5: emit ((s′f , s
′
g), φ
′′), for all emitted (s′g,φ′′) from update g((sg,φ′), ret)
6: end if
7: end for
3.5 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of the NetQRE system in C++, which consists of two
main components, namely the compiler for NetQRE, and the NetQRE runtime.
NetQRE Compiler. The NetQRE compiler implements the compilation algorithm
described in Section 3.4. The compiler first generates a C++ program from an input
NetQRE program, which is then compiled by the gcc compiler into executable. Our compiled
program uses a tree structure to represent predicates over parameters. The choice of trees
is driven by its simplicity, ease of encoding, and lookup performance.
In addition to the basic compilation algorithm, we include additional optimizations to
the compiler. First, we use the standard minimization algorithm to minimize the state
machine for a regular expression. Second, for aggregation expressions with sum and avg, we
use an incremental updating algorithm to update the expression: we maintain the running
sum as the state of the aggregation expression, and we update the sum incrementally when
the state of inner expression is updated.
NetQRE Runtime. The NetQRE runtime includes a packet capture agent implemented
using the pcap library [63]. Each packet that arrives at the runtime is parsed, and then
processed by the compiled NetQRE program as shown in Figure 3.1. Currently, our runtime
supports actions that include sending alert events to a controller, and directly installing a
rule on a switch. The NetQRE runtime is not specifically optimized for fast packet capture
and processing, and as future work, we plan to explore the use of DPDK [50].
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3.6 Evaluation
We evaluate our NetQRE prototype centered around answering three key questions. First,
can the NetQRE language express a wide range of quantitative network policies in a concise
and intuitive manner? Second, is the generated code efficient in terms of throughput? Third,
can NetQRE be used in a real-time monitoring setting that provides rapid mitigation based
on quantitative network policies? Unless otherwise specified, all our experiments are carried
out on a cluster of commodity servers, each of which has 16-core 2.1GHz Xeon E5-2450.
Each core has a 2MB L2 cache, and each processor includes a 20 MB L3 cache. The total
memory size is 24 GB. The OS is Ubuntu 12.04, and the kernel version is 3.13.0.
3.6.1 Expressiveness
We have implemented a set of quantitative network policies using NetQRE. The examples
are drawn from a literature survey on quantitative network policies [28, 36, 77, 91, 92].
Table 3.1 summarizes the example policies and the lines of code of each NetQRE program.
LoC
Heavy Hitter (Section 4.3.1) 6
Super Spreader (Section 4.3.1) 2
Entropy Estimation (Section 4.3.1) 6
Flow size dist. [36] 8
Traffic change detection [77] 10
Count traffic [91] 2
Completed flows (Section 4.3.2) 6
SYN flood detection (Section 4.3.2) 9
Lifetime of connection 8
Newly opened connection recently 11
# duplicated ACKs 5
# VoIP call 7
VoIP usage (Section 4.3.3) 18
Key word counting per email 23
Table 3.1: Example policies NetQRE supports.
We make the following observations. First, NetQRE is able to express a large variety
of policies, ranging from flow-level traffic measurement to application-level quantitative
policies. Second, programming in NetQRE is concise. All example policies can be specified
within 23 lines of code in NetQRE. This count includes commonly used filter functions as
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well as regular expressions, which can be built into a library for reference. As an interesting
comparison, we encoded the VoIP call use case in Bro [73], a well-known intrusion detection
system. Bro required 51 lines of code, as compared to only 7 in NetQRE. However, Bro is
unable to easily support the VoIP usage case written in NetQRE. In particular, it seems
hard for Bro to count bandwidth consumption per VoIP session. This is not surprising as
Bro’s primary use is that of an intrusion detection system. We validated the correctness of
our implementation on actual SIP traffic by comparing Bro’s output against NetQRE’s.
3.6.2 Throughput Performance
Our next set of experiments evaluate the performance of NetQRE’s compiled implementa-
tions. NetQRE runs on a single machine based on the setup described earlier. We use a
single core to measure NetQRE’s throughput. Throughput can be increased via orthogonal
parallelization techniques (e.g. [43]), which is not the main focus of the paper. Hence, all
reported numbers are based on single-threaded execution. As a point of comparison, we
compare each NetQRE program against an equivalent carefully hand-crafted C++ imple-
mentation. We note that all our hand-crafted implementations require at least 100 lines
of code, and often times, require users to explicit manage internal state across packets – a
programming task that NetQRE abstracts away.
Figure 3.8: Normalized throughput comparison.
Figure 3.8 shows the performance of NetQRE implementations compared with manu-
68
ally optimized implementations, where NetQRE throughput performance is presented as a
percentage of manually optimized implementations. We use as example policies, the heavy
hitter, super spreader, entropy, SYN flood detection, and completed flows count use cases
presented in Section 3.3. As workload, we use a CAIDA traffic trace [1] which contains
37 million packets, and replay the traffic as input to our implementations. The compiled
NetQRE implementation incurs negligible overhead compared with the manually optimized
low-level implementation. The difference between the throughput of the compiled NetQRE
implementation and that of the manual implementation is within 4% across all use cases
we studied.
To understand the performance compared with alternative tools, we further compare
with OpenSketch and Bro.
Comparison with OpenSketch. We use the heavy hitter example (with a single field, as
in the OpenSketch’s reference code) to compare the performance of NetQRE compiled code
with that of OpenSketch (in software). We follow the default setting of the reference code
of OpenSketch [9]. The throughput of NetQRE compiled code is 72% higher than that of
OpenSketch.
Comparison with Bro. We further compare with Bro. Given the limitations of Bro
in handling the complete VoIP use cases, we simplify the use case to simply counting the
number of VoIP calls (as opposed to bandwidth consumption) per user. NetQRE compiled
implementation can finish counting within 1 second, while Bro takes about 23 seconds. Both
programs output the same results for this use case. We believe there are at least two reasons
for Bro’s slower performance. First, Bro is designed for intrusion detection, and not aimed
at and optimized for monitoring tasks. Second, unlike NetQRE which compiles high-level
code to efficient low-level code, Bro uses an interpreter to execute the script written in Bro’s
language, which could result in considerable overhead.
3.6.3 Real-time Response
In the final set of experiments, we validate the use of NetQRE for enforcing quantitative
network policies, through a combination of switch-level monitoring, followed by updates
from the controller. We set up a network of two clients C1 and C2, one server, and one SDN
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switch that mirrors traffic to a NetQRE runtime running the SYN flood detector presented
in Section 3.3.2. In addition, a NetQRE controller based on POX [64] controls the switch.
The network is emulated using Mininet [59] with link bandwidth set to 100Mbps.
In the experiment, C1 sends normal traffic to S using iperf at rate 1Mbps, and at the
7th second, C2 starts SYN flood attack generated using our generator to the same server.
The attack is detected by NetQRE, which generates an alert event to the controller, which
subsequently installs a forwarding rule on the switch to block traffic from C2. To illustrate
the attack detection and blocking, Figure 3.9 shows the bandwidth utilization (Mbps) on
the server. We observe that NetQRE successfully blocks C2’s attacking traffic in real-time.
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Figure 3.9: SYN flood: Bandwidth utilization (Mbps) at the server.
As a second experiment, using a similar setup, our NetQRE heavy hitter program (Sec-
tion 3.3.1) running at a switch-side NetQRE runtime monitors the traffic, and issues an alert
to the controller when detecting a heavy hitter, which further blocks the traffic. As a point
of comparison, we compare our approach against two alternatives: (1) sending all packets
to the controller which runs an equivalent heavy hitter detection program, (2) monitoring
the flow counters on the switch to detect heavy hitters, as considered in other languages [67]
and systems [69]. In the second alternative, the controller reads the counter every 1 second,
and compute the bandwidth usage for each flow over a 5 seconds window.
Figure 3.10 plots the bandwidth utilization of the server. The above alternative solutions
are labeled as forward and stats respectively. Compared with these two approaches, our
proposed approach can detect the heavy hitter and further respond to it in a more timely
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fashion. Moreover, compared with the forward approach, we send significantly fewer traffic
to the controller, and is a more scalable solution.
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Figure 3.10: Heavy hitter detection: Bandwidth utilization (Mbps) at the server.
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Figure 3.11: VoIP: Bandwidth utilization (Mbps) at the server.
In our final experiment, we validate the VoIP use case first presented in our introduction.
We use a synthetic VoIP traffic trace generated using SIPp [12] replay a VoIP call (with
accompanying H.264 MPEG video) made from a single user via client C2. We replay the
traffic at 5Mbps, and run iperf on C1 as the background traffic. Our NetQRE program
enforces a policy that blocks a call after the user making the call exceeds a SIP bandwidth
usage of 18.75MB (around 30 seconds). We configure the NetQRE program to send an alert
to the NetQRE controller which then blocks the traffic. Figure 3.11 plots the bandwidth
utilization of the server. Again, this verifies that NetQRE can be used to intercept a SIP
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session, monitor usage on a per-user basis, and react to high usage in a timely fashion.
3.6.4 Summary of Evaluation
Revisiting the three questions at the beginning of our evaluation, we observe that (1)
NetQRE can express a wide range of quantitative network policies with a few lines of
code, (2) achieves performance that is similar to that of carefully hand-crafted optimized
low-level code while significantly outperforms other measurement and IDS tools, and (3)
can be used in an SDN setting to monitor network traffic and update switches in real-time
in response to specified NetQRE policies.
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Chapter 4
Related Work
We highlight several work in a variety of topics that are related to the dissertation.
4.1 Domain Specific Languages in Networking
Network Datalog (NDlog) [61] is a declarative language to program network protocols, which
is based on the well-known recursive query language Datalog. In NDlog, network state, such
as network links and paths between a source and a destination, is modeled as relations. A
user uses a set of rules to specify the derivation of tuples in the relations. NDlog extends
Datalog by allowing a user to specify storage locations of tuples explicitly. By specifying
the storage locations, a NDlog program models the distributed computation over network
state without specifying imperative details such as sending and receiving a message.
With the emergence of SDN, there are several recent proposals on domain specific
languages in SDN, which include Frenetic [40], Pyretic [67], NetCore [66] NetKAT [19],
FlowLog [72], Merlin [84], FatTire [75], and Maple [88].
Frenetic [40], NetCore [66], and Pyretic [67] propose high-level abstractions to specify
packet forwarding and network queries based on OpenFlow. These languages use high-
level predicates to capture the semantics of flow-table rules in OpenFlow, and allow logical
combinations such as conjunction, disjunction, and negation on the predicates to simplify
the specification of flow tables. The semantics of these languages are compositional, which
allows users to compose two modules in a parallel and sequential fashion. In addition to
the high-level abstractions for static flow-table policies, these languages support dynamic
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policies using general-purpose programs in order to respond to network events and change
the flow tables.
NetKAT [19] is proposed with a solid theoretical foundation based on Kleene algebra
with tests [57] to specify static packet forwarding policies. As a result, checking whether
two forwarding policies specified in NetKAT are equivalent can be decided in PSPACE
complexity, which allows network verification of properties such as reachability and traffic
isolation.
The SDN languages described above focus on raising the level of abstractions for data
plane policies. Below we highlight some work involving abstractions for control plane.
Flowlog [72] proposes a unified programming framework to capture data plane, control
plane and controller state. Flowlog uses relations to store network state, and also offers a
SQL-like language to specify the reaction to network events. Programs in Flowlog can be
proactively compiled and installed onto flow tables. Furthermore, Flowlog offers sound and
complete verification on the programs using the verifier Alloy [51].
Kinetic [55] proposes to use the state machine abstraction to program dynamic policies,
where a state corresponds to a static policy which can be specified in Pyretic, and a tran-
sition corresponds to network events, user-defined events, or unexpected failures. Kinetic
utilizes the NuSMV model checker [31] to automatically verify the correctness properties
specified in computation tree logic (CTL) [33].
Similar state machine abstractions have also been studied in OpenState [22] and FAST [68].
These works aim at designing state machine models that can be embedded into switches,
and thus executing stateful policies on the data plane efficiently.
There are also language proposals aimed at providing abstractions for packet-routing
paths in the network [70, 75] using regular expressions.
FatTire [75] is a language for fault-tolerant network routing policies. FatTire uses regular
expressions to specify the set of paths for packets in a specified flow space, and allows a
user to specify the degree of faults to tolerate. A program in FatTire can be compiled into
OpenFlow-based flow tables using the group tables [13], which is able to tolerate the given
degree of faults.
The path query language proposed in [70] is a declarative language aimed at traffic
monitoring. A query in this language uses regular expressions over packet locations and
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header values to specify the packets (together with its routing paths) to be monitored. The
packets satisfying the regular expression are counted. In addition, the language further
leverages SQL-like “groupby” operation for aggregating the monitoring results.
The work in this dissertation shares similar goals with the work described above. How-
ever, there are several technical differences between our work and the work described above.
For example, while the abstraction of policy tables in NetEgg is similar in spirit to these
state machine abstractions, but however, NetEgg focuses on providing an intuitive pro-
gramming framework which can generate policies directly from examples. Although some
languages above have features to support traffic monitoring that NetQRE supports, how-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, none of these systems support monitoring queries beyond
basic flow-level counters provided by OpenFlow.
4.2 Network Verification and Testing
In recent years there have been a number of proposals in network verification and testing.
We highlight several work in this section, including techniques for the data plane ([38, 52–
54, 62, 95]) as well as the techniques for the control plane ([20, 27]).
First, we highlight some work aimed at stateless data plane verification.
Header Space Analysis (HSA) [53] models each device in the network as a network
transfer function, which maps a located packet (i.e. a packet together with its location) to
a set of located packets. Using a customized symbolic execution technique, HSA is able to
verify properties such as reachability, forwarding loops and traffic isolation.
Veriflow [54] and NetPlumber [52] introduce real-time data plane verification. Unlike
HSA which needs to re-check data plane properties every time a rule is changed, these tech-
niques only consider the incremental change of the data plane introduced by each forwarding
rule’s update, and check properties only on the delta part.
On the other hand, Anteater [62] uses a different approach. Anteater encodes the
data plane configuration and the property as a boolean satisfiability formula (SAT). Using
SAT solvers for the SAT problem, Anteater is able to verify the properties or generate a
counterexample for violations.
There are works aimed at runtime testing for data plane. ATPG [95] generates test
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packets that are injected to the network to test functional properties as well as performance
properties. More recently, Buzz [38] proposes a technique based on symbolic execution to
generate test packets in order to test stateful data plane.
Second, we highlight some work for control plane verification and testing. Nice [27]
employs both model checking and symbolic execution to test SDN controller programs.
Vericon [20] proposes a verification techniques that can verify the correctness of a controller
application for all admissible network topologies and all network events.
4.3 Program Synthesis
This dissertation work is also related to the topic on program synthesis.
The Sketch system [81–83] has been developed for synthesizing bit-stream programs [83],
stencil computations [81] and concurrent data structures [82]. The Sketch system allows
users to specify a partial implementation (which is called a sketch), and then synthesizes a
complete implementation that is equivalent to a given program from the sketch.
The NetEgg work is motivated by related work on programming by examples. In partic-
ular, the proposals in [47–49] implement reactive controllers from specification of behaviors
in live sequence charts. Recently, programming by examples has been applied for a variety
of domains [17, 21, 44, 45, 56, 60, 79]. FlashFill [44] generates string transformation macros
in Excel from input/output string examples. Transit [87] uses both symbolic and concrete
example to synthesize distributed protocols. Examples are also used for synthesizing recur-
sive programs [17]. The NetEgg work is similar in spirit to above works, but technically
different. Our input examples and target program are designed specific to the SDN domain,
and have different characteristics, which require different synthesis algorithms.
4.4 Other Topics
In addition to the topics addressed above, there are several other topics that are related to
the work presented in this dissertation. In this section, we describe the related work in the
following topics.
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4.4.1 Streaming Database Languages
Database-style query languages [29, 34] provide SQL-like language support for running
continuous queries over data streams. While there are constructs to do aggregation over
sliding windows, they are designed with simple relational queries over packet headers or
packet counts, and cannot handle the complex queries based on traffic patterns that NetQRE
supports.
4.4.2 Intrusion Detection Systems and Protocol Analyzers
There are a number of intrusion detection systems (IDS) and protocol analyzers, which
can support some part of policies that NetQRE supports. However, there are several key
differences between NetQRE and these systems. First of all, systems such as Snort [76] al-
low regular expression matches over packet payloads, but is not perform regular expression
matches that span multiple packets, let alone track sessions across packets. While Bro [73]
supports aspects of NetQRE, the scripting language requires operators to think impera-
tively in terms of states and events, as opposed to NetQRE’s approach of using high-level
declarative constructs. Moreover, IDS such as Bro is ill-suited to handle some of the use
cases involving quantitative monitoring, e.g. the VoIP usage example.
4.4.3 Deep Packet Inspection
In NetQRE, we studied its support for deep packet inspection. There are a variety of
commercial products that perform Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). In recent literature, Sc-
analytics [43] provides a parallel Datalog-based DPI engine, but the focus is on parallelism
and high performance, and hence the language does not lend itself naturally to customiza-
tion of regular expressions and aggregation. DPI poses a challenge on encrypted data, an
orthogonal issue that is addressed by other work (e.g. BlindBox [78]).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this chapter, we conclude our contributions in this dissertation and propose future work
related to this topic.
5.1 Contributions
This dissertation studied the feasibility of using high-level abstractions for programming
network policies. In particular, we studied two approaches aimed at stateful SDN policies
and quantitative network policies, respectively.
First, we proposed NetEgg, a scenario-based programming framework for SDN policies.
To program a network policy using NetEgg, network operators simply describe example be-
haviors of the desire network policy in representative scenarios. NetEgg then automatically
synthesizes a policy implementation that is consistent with all given scenarios, including
inferring the state that needs to be maintained and also the rules to update the state.
NetEgg can run the policy on top of a centralized controller as well as automatically infer
the flow-table rules to install onto switches. Our experiments showed that NetEgg was able
to synthesize a wide range of network policies from scenarios in seconds. Moreover, the
synthesized policy implementations achieved close performance with manually crafted im-
plementations. We conducted a user study including 12 students. The results showed that
NetEgg was reasonably intuitive to learn and use, and was able to reduce the programming
time for 2 out of 3 network policies we studied.
Second, we proposed NetQRE, a specification language and toolkit for quantitative net-
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work policies. NetQRE offers a declarative specification language that integrates regular-
expression-like patter matching and aggregation operations. Given a NetQRE specification
program, the NetQRE compiler automatically infers the state that needs to be maintained,
and generates an efficient policy implementation. We showed that NetQRE is expressive to
specify a wide range of quantitative network policies using a small number of lines of code.
Our experiments demonstrated that the performance of the policy implementations gener-
ated by NetQRE was comparable to the implementations manually crafted and optimized
in low-level code, and was significantly more efficient than alternative solutions.
5.2 Future Work
We discuss some potential research directions to extend the work described in the disserta-
tion.
5.2.1 Interaction between Network Programmer and Programming
Framework
The emergence of programmable networks triggers a new wave of innovations in network
programming frameworks. Oftentimes, these programming frameworks are driven by spe-
cific types of applications, and seldom address their interaction with network programmers.
Therefore, it remains a key challenge to understand how network programmers interact
with these programming frameworks. In particular, it is interesting to address the following
problems: how to make a programming framework accessible to network programmers; how
to improve the productivity of network programmers; and how to enhance the reliability of
networks with the aid of network programming frameworks.
5.2.2 Network Verification and Synthesis
The programmability of networks stimulates increasing interest in formal verification of
network programs and configurations, in order to ensure the correctness of network services.
However, given the fact that verification techniques are often expensive, network verification
faces the following challenges: 1) how to enable verification for interesting properties such
as those involving quantitative objectives; 2) how to scale the verification techniques up
79
to large-size networks. Additionally, it is appealing to automatically synthesize network
topologies, configurations, and control programs directly from network operators’ high-
level requirements, with the correctness guaranteed by the process of synthesis. Recent
progress on data plane programing frameworks such as P4 [23] also offers new opportunities
in verifying and synthesizing data plane implementations.
In response to these challenges and opportunities, a potential extend to this dissertation
work is to develop verification technique for the proposed domain-specific languages. More-
over, it is appealing to develop domain-specific specification languages that are expressive to
specify a variety of interesting properties, and their corresponding verification and synthesis
techniques that are scalable up to real-world networks.
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